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THE CIVIL RIGHTS HYDRA 
Neal Devins* 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA. By Hugh Davis Graham. New York: Ox- 
ford University Press. 1990. Pp. x, 578. $29.95. 
The story of federal civil rights enforcement may be impossible to 
chronicle. Antidiscrimination requirements bind all federal agencies1 
and each agency brings to this drama its own unique experiences. In- 
deed, during the Reagan years, significant civil rights enforcement 
controversies emerged in such unlikely places as the National Endow- 
ment for the Humanities,2 the Federal Communications Commission,3 
the Department of the Treasury,4 and the Department of Transporta- 
tion.5 There were also controversies involving the usual suspects 
the Department of Justice,6 the Equal Employment Opportunity Com- 
* Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William & Mary. A.B. 
1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt. - Ed. Thanks to Herman Belz, Larry 
Evans, Phil Lyons, Jeremy Rabkin, and Charles Shanor for valuable commentary. All errors are 
my own. 
1. See infra notes 142-43. 
2. See Hearing on Reauthorization of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities 
Act of 1965: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985) (questioning NEA refusal to file an affirmative 
action plan with the EEOC). 
3. See Hearings on HR. 5373 Before Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protec- 
tion, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) 
(oversight hearings questioning propriety of FCC reexamination of race and gender preferences); 
see also Devins, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 125 
(1990). 
4. See Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Racially Dis- 
criminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess. 193-94, 213-14, 218-20, 236, 237 (1982) (testimony of R.T. McNamar, Deputy Secre- 
tary, Treasury; Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General; and William Bradford Reyn- 
olds, Asst. Attorney General, questioning propriety of IRS rescission of nondiscrimination rules 
governing receipt of federal tax exemptions); see also Rabkin, Behind the Tax-Exempt School 
Debate, PUB. INT., Summer 1982, at 21. 
5. See The Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program of the Federal-Aid Highway Act: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Pub- 
lic Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Reauthorization of the Federal-Aid Highway Program: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1986); SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY 
ACT OF 1986, S. REP. NO. 369, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 
6. Controversy and dissatisfaction with the Department of Justice is best reflected in the 
Senate's failure to confirm William Bradford Reynolds, Reagan's Assistant Attorney General for 
civil rights, as Associate Attorney General. See Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds to be 
Associate Attorney General of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici- 
ary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For overview critiques, see U.S. COMMN. ON CIV. RIGHTS, 
FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS 45-65 (1987) [hereinafter 
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mission,7 the Department of Labor,8 the Small Business Administra- 
tion,9 the Department of Education,10 the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development," and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.'2 
This complex web does not lend itself to generalization and, not sur- 
prisingly, scholars have been reluctant to undertake the arduous task 
of a comprehensive treatment of this topic. 
A recent and welcome attempt at a far-ranging examination of fed- 
eral civil rights enforcement is Hugh Davis Graham's The Civil Rights 
Era.13 Graham examines the years 1960-1972 and makes his subject 
the executive branch. The executive branch is chosen in order to ex- 
amine the "full policy cycle."'4 As Graham aptly notes: "[W]hile 
presidents and congresses come and go, the federal agencies abide, de- 
fining through administrative law and regulation the precise meaning 
of broad statutory provisions that Congress could not conceivably tai- 
lor to the nuances of America's workaday life" (p. 7). Graham chose 
the 1960-1972 time period for two reasons. First, in Graham's estima- 
tion, comprehensive federal attention to civil rights begins with the 
1960 Kennedy election and by 1972 the "new order" of comprehensive 
civil rights enforcement was set in place (p. 4). Second, during this 
period, civil rights policy evolved from a focus on individualized fair 
1987 CRC REPORT]; Reynolds, The Reagan Administration's Civil Rights Policy: The Challenge 
for the Future, 42 VAND. L. REV. 993 (1989). 
7. See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agen- 
cies Appropriations for 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Departments of Commerce, 
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 354 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Clarence Thomas, Chair- 
man, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a Reagan appointee criticizing Carter-era 
guidelines as a "rigid and mechanical mathematical approach" concerning discrimination); 
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BY THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTU- 
NITY COMMN. (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter REPORT] (criticizing EEOC pattern and practice 
charge processing). 
8. See Affirmative Action and Federal Contract Compliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1985) (reviewing White House examination of Executive Order 11,246); see also McDowell, 
Affirmative Inaction, POLY. REV., Spring 1989, at 32. 
9. See supra note 5. 
10. See HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FAILURE AND FRAUD IN CIVIL 
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, H.R. REP. NO. 334, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (criticizing Department of Education enforcement of civil rights laws); see 
also N. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 33-59 (1988). 
11. See N. AMAKER, supra note 10, at 79-101. 
12. See Presidential Nominations to the Civil Rights Commission: Hearings on the Nomina- 
tions of Morris B. Abram, John A. Bunzel, Robert A. Destro, and Linda Chavez Before the Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter Nomination 
Hearings]; see also Comment, The Rise and Fall of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449 (1987). 
13. Hugh Davis Graham is Professor of History at the University of Maryland, Baltimore. 
14. "Full policy cycle," in addition to examining "the formulation and enactment phases of 
the policy cycle," considers "the obscure and complex phase of implementation." P. 5. 
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treatment objectives to emphasis on group claims for proportionate 
representation (p. 5). 
Graham's objective is lofty and he accomplishes much. The Civil 
Rights Era is a gripping, literate account of landmark civil rights legis- 
lation governing employment, housing, and voting. The executive 
branch focus is also useful both in demonstrating the fundamental role 
played by the White House in the enactment of these legislative re- 
forms and in providing insightful glimpses into the Kennedy, Johnson, 
and Nixon administrations. Graham, moreover, provides revealing 
looks at several executive initiatives, many of which are as influential 
as civil rights legislation.'5 For these reasons, The Civil Rights Era is a 
highly accessible and quite worthwhile addition to the literature. 
Graham's undertaking is only a mixed success, however. Gra- 
ham's suggestion that civil rights policy shifted from simple nondis- 
crimination to group rights between 1966 and 1968 (p. 456) is subject 
to question. Although - as Graham convincingly demonstrates 
Congress rejected both numerical proofs of discrimination and quota 
hiring in passing the 1964 Civil Rights Act,'6 ample evidence exists 
that civil rights activists both inside and outside the Executive were 
interested in numerical equality from the start.17 The great transfor- 
mation of civil rights policy then is more a reflection of how the ad- 
ministration of law transcends the letter of the law. This important 
point buttresses Graham's "full policy cycle" emphasis, but it is not 
made in The Civil Rights Era. More significantly, Graham does not 
meet the challenge he sets for himself through his use of "full policy 
cycle" analysis, namely, the demonstration of the stranglehold pos- 
sessed by the permanent civil rights establishment over the White 
House and its appointees. Neither the relationship between interest 
groups and enforcement agencies nor the relationship between over- 
sight committees and enforcement agencies is given serious treatment. 
Moreover, relative to the extensive treatment given the enactment of 
civil rights legislation and the promulgation of executive orders, 
agency enforcement decisions are given short shrift. In some respects, 
this failing is inevitable. The story of implementation begins after the 
enactment of legislation. The Civil Rights Era is fundamentally a book 
about a period in which elected branch efforts focused on the enact- 
ment stage. Furthermore, Graham seems only marginally interested 
in the politics of implementation during the 1960-1972 period. 
15. Graham clearly deserves accolades for his exhaustive research of White House sources 
available through the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon libraries. See pp. 477-79 (describing re- 
search methodology). 
16. Pp. 125-52. Quota hiring mandates the employment of a predetermined percentage of 
some group (women, racial minorities, etc.) in the workplace; numerical proofs of discrimination 
pay attention to group imbalance in determining whether an employer has engaged in illegal 
discrimination. 
17. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text. 
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These omissions are truly unfortunate. The 1960-1972 period is a 
benchmark for the administrative presidency. The twilight of the im- 
perial presidency associated with the New Deal was the Johnson presi- 
dency, and the Nixon administration marked the imperial presidency's 
demise.18 From 1958 to 1974, Congress became more liberal and 
more assertive.19 This change was caused in large measure by the 
weakening of conservative southern Democrats in Congress associated 
with 1960s civil rights reform.20 Congress' rising assertiveness, during 
the Nixon years at least, also was reflected in increasing legislative 
oversight of policy implementation. Recognizing that Congress has 
ultimate power over program content and funding, agency heads 
proved responsive to committee concerns. By the early 1970s, Rich- 
ard Nixon launched the so-called "administrative presidency"21 in an 
effort to restore White House control of the administrative state. 
These dramatic sea changes in government are hardly noticeable in 
The Civil Rights Era. Graham's work is too much about specific 
events and too little about changing landscapes. In the end, it is an 
excellent book that dares to be great but does not quite make it. In- 
deed, Graham's ambitions and his skillful presentation of an epic story 
of civil rights reform make the book's inability to reach its intended 
heights a bit surprising. 
This review serves as a partial bridge between what Graham in- 
tends and what he delivers. Part I describes some of the book's ample 
lessons. Attention is placed in Part I on Graham's too-short discus- 
sion of agency policymaking and administration. Part II supplements 
this discussion by referring to pertinent 1960-1972 era policymaking 
and administration not given serious treatment in the book. Part III 
- consistent with Graham's inadequately proven thesis - argues that 
it is extremely difficult for a president to centralize civil rights enforce- 
ment. This Part focuses on the Reagan White House's limited success 
in changing the face of civil rights enforcement. 
The Reagan experience, however, suggests a far more complicated 
story than the one depicted by Graham. The presidency, despite the 
difficulties of centralization, is neither enfeebled nor captured by civil 
rights interest groups. An administration with a clear ideological vi- 
18. Prior to the middle or late 1960s, according to Martin Shapiro, the norm was that 
"[c]ourts should defer to Congress, Congress should defer to the President. So courts really were 
to defer to the Executive." Shapiro, A.P.A.: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 451 
(1986). 
19. See Melnick, The Courts, Congress, and Programmatic Rights, in REMAKING AMERICAN 
POLITICS 188 (R. Harris & S. Milikis eds. 1989). 
20. See id. 
21. R. NATHAN, THE PLOT THAT FAILED: NIXON AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESI- 
DENCY (1975). With respect to the fundamental importance of administration, see P. ARNOLD, 
MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENT (1986). It is Arnold's position that "the president 
ought to be concerned with administration, not because he is a manager but because administra- 
tion is part of the system through which his choices become policy." Id. at 363. 
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sion, a commitment to that vision, and political savvy can effectively 
centralize its civil rights enforcement efforts. The Reagan administra- 
tion, contrary to popular wisdom, lacked both a clear ideological vi- 
sion with respect to civil rights and a commitment to pursue that 
vision. Instead, the administration viewed civil rights as a matter to be 
worked out through the tugs and pulls of politics. Consequently, civil 
rights centralization took a back seat to tax reform, federalism, and 
deregulation objectives. 
Reagan administration civil rights enforcement efforts also were 
marred by political ineptitude. Unwilling to work within the political 
culture they inherited, Reagan political appointees sacrificed gains in 
enforcement by engaging in pitched and counterproductive battles 
with Congress and the civil rights community. A more adept adminis- 
tration, contrary to Graham's assertions, would have made far more 
progress in advancing its agenda. 
Conservatives who bemoan the death of the presidency are in er- 
ror. The presidency - albeit constrained - remains potent. By sum- 
marizing and extending Graham's work, this review provides a 
glimpse into the exercise and management of presidential power. 
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA DESCRIBED 
Graham describes his work as a story about a "social move- 
ment[ ]" which "broke the back of the system of racial segregation" (p. 
3). As such, Graham considers all federal action in the civil rights 
arena fair game for investigation. From this huge smorgasbord, Gra- 
ham has chosen employment, voting, fair housing, and the equal rights 
amendment. By book's end, however, it is apparent that only one is- 
sue truly matters to Graham. The dominant target of Graham's study 
is employment - both the enactment and enforcement of statutory 
antidiscrimination prohibitions and executive initiatives to increase 
minority employment among government contractors. 
Graham accomplishes much through this choice of emphasis. 
First, employment best reveals the "full policy cycle" that Graham 
seeks to penetrate. Unlike court-driven school desegregation and vot- 
ing, employment policy is fundamentally the domain of the adminis- 
trative state. Second, the shift from individual protection to group 
rights was played out more explicitly in the employment context than 
in any other area. 
The inclusion of other select topics, then, enriches and provides a 
broader frame for understanding the establishment and evolution of 
employment policy. To the extent that Graham intends to tell a com- 
prehensive story of 1960-1972 reforms, moreover, these otherwise an- 
cillary matters are essential. In any event, Graham's discussion of 
voting, housing, and equal rights - even if tangential - provides im- 
portant insights to these topics. The housing chapter, for example, 
1727 May 1991] 
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clarifies the common misperception that the 1968 Civil Rights Act was 
enacted to stave off racial unrest in the wake of the April 1968 King 
assassination. In March 1968, after President Johnson had effectively 
given up on open housing legislation due to prior legislative disinter- 
est, the Senate "astonishing[ly]" pursued the matter with vigor - in- 
cluding invoking cloture on a southern filibuster (p. 270). While the 
King murder accelerated House action, Congress' action appears not 
to have been driven by expediency. 
In contrast, expediency had very much to do with President 
Nixon's "stewardship" of the equal rights amendment. Graham's in- 
sightful discussion reveals that the Nixon White House's interest in 
gender issues was spurred by Urban Affairs Council head Daniel Pat- 
rick Moynihan's recommendation that Nixon "take advantage of a 
surging force that was ripe for creative leadership" (p. 400). The 
White House responded by creating a Women's Task Force whose re- 
port (favoring E.R.A.-type solutions to gender inequality (p. 405)) lan- 
guished until a coalition of prominent Republican women pressured 
the White House (p. 406). The upshot of this was the White House 
"fastening on any positive action it could safely take to rally the 
aroused women's support" (p. 408), for example, supporting the 
E.R.A.22 
Expediency also plays a large role in Graham's account of the 
Nixon administration's handling of voting rights. As part of his strat- 
egy to woo southern Democrats to the Republican party, Nixon un- 
successfully sought repeal of the 1965 Voting Rights Act requirement 
that southern states "preclear" any electoral changes that would ad- 
versely affect minority interests.23. Nixon's efforts in voting rights also 
reveal the close nexus between bureaucratic structure and civil rights 
policy. In 1969, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department 
was reorganized from sections corresponding to geographic regions to 
sections organized by function. With respect to voting, the reorgani- 
zation "'had the unanticipated consequence of producing an exper- 
ienced team of attorneys dedicated to furthering [preclearance 
objectives].' "24 
22. Interestingly, the only Nixon official to oppose the E.R.A. vigorously was then Assistant 
Attorney General William Rehnquist who viewed the overall effect of the amendment as " 'noth- 
ing less than the sharp reduction in importance of the family unit, with the eventual elimination 
of that unit by no means improbable.'" P. 408 (quoting Garment to Ehrlichman, Memorandum 
for the President, May 25, 1970). Indeed, in congressional testimony recognizing that "'Presi- 
dent Nixon and this Administration support the goal of establishing equal rights for women,' " 
Rehnquist nonetheless argued against the propriety of the amendment. P. 417 (quoting H.R.J. 
Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist)). 
23. Pp. 356-60. The administration also sought to win favor in the South by highlighting the 
hypocrisy of dual north-south standards. Noting that a higher percentage of minorities voted in 
the South than in either New York or California, the administration sought a nationwide - as 
opposed to a South-only - ban on literacy tests. Pp. 354-55. 
24. P. 362 (quoting S. LAWSON, PURSUIT OF POWER 162-63 (1985) (emphasis added)). 
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Voting is important for another reason. The preclearance provi- 
sion in the 1965 Act, according to Graham, was the first "hint[] of a 
radical shift from procedural to substantive criteria in civil rights law, 
from intent to effect, from equal opportunity as a right to equality as a 
fact and as a result" (p. 174). The story of this shift lies at the heart of 
The Civil Rights Era. It is a story told by reference to executive fair 
employment initiatives, antidiscrimination laws passed by Congress, 
and agency initiatives. 
A. The Kennedy Years 
The Kennedy era, despite Graham's meticulous one hundred-page 
account, reveals surprisingly little about the shift from fair treatment 
to just result objectives. "Insecure in his relations with Congress" (p. 
65), Kennedy ducked an activist role in civil rights issues until his 
hand was forced by racial violence in the South (p. 66). Indeed, Ken- 
nedy balked at including an antidiscrimination-in-employment provi- 
sion in proposed federal civil rights legislation.25 The White House, 
instead, endorsed a combination of voluntary efforts by private busi- 
ness (Plans for Progress), in which the administration served as cheer- 
leader,26 and an interagency committee headed by Vice President 
Johnson designed to ensure nondiscrimination in the awarding of fed- 
eral grants. Without real authority over federal grants or loans, af- 
fected agencies subordinated antidiscrimination objectives to their own 
interests in efficient procurement and "back-scratching mutuality" 
with existing contractors (p. 44). As Graham notes, "the President's 
unifying command and power" (p. 44) is prerequisite to centralization 
of otherwise diffuse agency interests. Without strong presidential 
leadership, as the Kennedy experience reveals, department and agency 
heads will view themselves as kings over their discrete domains. 
The Kennedy years are revealing for another reason. The origins 
of affirmative action can be traced to a Kennedy executive order re- 
quiring government contractors to take "affirmative action to ensure 
that applicants [and]. . . employees are treated ... without regard to 
their race, creed, color, or national origin."27 Graham is quick to 
point out the irony that this "affirmative action" demand called for 
nothing more than the fair treatment objective of eliminating discrimi- 
natory employment practices (pp. 34, 41). Indeed, when asked his 
views of demands by black leaders for "job quotas by race," Kennedy 
responded, "I don't think we can undo the past .... [While] the past 
25. Pp. 95-99. Kennedy, however, did issue an executive order in November 1962 mandat- 
ing nondiscrimination in federally assisted housing. See R. MORGAN, THE PRESIDENT AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS 60-78 (1970). 
26. Pp. 50-54. The administration ultimately withdrew its support for this voluntary ap- 
proach in favor of more traditional compliance and enforcement. Id. at 54-59. 
27. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1972 (1961). 
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is going to be with us for a good many years ... [w]e have to do the 
best we can now .... I don't think quotas are a good idea."28 
There were foreshadowings of measures of numerical equality dur- 
ing the Kennedy years, however. The Labor Department, in respond- 
ing to discrimination in apprenticeship training, proposed that 
apprenticeship lists "be disregarded to the extent necessary to provide 
opportunities [for qualified minorities] ... for a significant number of 
positions."29 Rescinded under intense union pressure, the labor action 
seems a precursor to the race conscious apprenticeship training pro- 
gram approved fifteen years later by the Supreme Court in United 
Steelworkers v. Weber.30 Graham also notes divisions among civil 
rights leaders on the quota question (pp. 116-21), but he dismisses this 
evidence, concluding that "the debate [during the Kennedy years] over 
racial quotas elicited a virtually unanimous public condemnation of 
the notion of racial preference" (p. 120). 
B. The Johnson and Nixon Administrations 
A different saga is told concerning the Johnson administration 
which, according to Graham, transformed the goal of civil rights pol- 
icy toward the achievement of numerical equality. This transforma- 
tion involved both White House and agency initiated programs. That 
this transformation occurred during the Johnson years is hardly sur- 
prising. Unlike Kennedy, Johnson cared passionately about racial 
equality and made it a centerpiece of his administration.31 
President Johnson's views are best revealed in a June 1965 speech 
at Howard University. At this speech, Johnson exclaimed that "free- 
dom is not enough" and that "the next and more profound stage of the 
battle for civil rights ... [is] not just equality as a right and a theory 
but equality as a fact and equality as a result."32 For Johnson, a rem- 
edy promising fair outcomes was the only way to "wipe away the scars 
of centuries."33 This speech, in the eyes of Johnson official Joseph 
Califano, demonstrates Johnson's "unabashed[] [support] for special 
help and affirmative action."34 Graham, while more circumspect, rec- 
28. PUB. PAPERS: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1963, at 633-34 (1964) (Aug. 20, 1963 Press 
Conference). 
29. P. 115 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Labor press release, June 6, 1963). 
30. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding voluntary one minority for one nonminority promotion 
plan promulgated in response to pervasive union discrimination). 
31. See J. CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA 230 (1981) (describing Johnson's commitment 
to civil rights as "passionate"). 
32. 2 PUB. PAPERS: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965, at 636 (1966). 
33. Id. For Johnson, one mechanism of ensuring fair outcomes was the race-specific designa- 
tion of certain political appointments. See, e.g., p. 226 (discussing Johnson's desire to replace 
EEOC Commissioner Aileen Hernandez from a "list of Mexicans" prepared by John Connally). 
34. J. CALIFANO, supra note 31, at 231. 
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ognizes the speech to be a foreshadowing of a "crucial transition" (p. 
174). 
Ironically, the true precursors to the shift to numerical equality are 
two events soundly rooted in fair individual treatment objectives. 
First, in a nonpolicy-driven reorganization of federal civil rights en- 
forcement (p. 184), President Johnson entrusted with the Secretary of 
Labor the responsibility to ensure that government contractors "as an 
initial part of their bid" comply with the preexisting demand that "af- 
firmative action" be taken to root out discrimination on the basis of 
"race, creed, color, or national origin."35 Better known as Executive 
Order 11,246, this reorganization ultimately set in motion the demand 
for adequate minority representation among federal contractors.36 
Second, a White House team comprised of Robert Kennedy, 
Nicholas Katzenbach, and Burke Marshall worked with Republican 
Senator Everett Dirksen to assure passage of Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and, with it, to create the EEOC. Graham convinc- 
ingly shows that Title VII was designed both to avoid the imposition 
of numerical hiring demands on employers and to limit the sweep of 
EEOC power (pp. 125-52). Title VII provisions require proof of dis- 
criminatory intent,37 prohibit the granting of "preferential treatment" 
to attain racial balance,38 and protect an employer's right to use pro- 
fessionally developed ability testing unless it was "designed, intended, 
or used to discriminate."39 The EEOC was denied the "cease and de- 
sist" powers of investigation, litigation, and adjudication typically as- 
sociated with independent agencies. Instead, the EEOC's role was 
limited to complaint-processing associated with private enforcement.40 
According to Graham, this limited role was pushed by Dirksen to pro- 
tect employers from "harassment" by "a new mission agency like the 
EEOC" (p. 146). Despite these structural and statutory limitations, 
35. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). Executive Order 11,246 was typical 
of the Johnson administration practice of using reorganizations to accomplish efficiency rather 
than policy objectives. See E. REDFORD & M. BLISSETT, ORGANIZING THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 107-41 (1981). For discussion of policymaking by way of reorganization see infra notes 
180-82 and accompanying text. 
36. Ironically, liberals at the time criticized Executive Order 11,246 for dissolving a White 
House Coordinating Council chaired by Hubert Humphrey in favor of Labor Department en- 
forcement. P. 188. 
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 706(g), 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-5(g) (1988). In explaining this 
provision, Hubert Humphrey noted that "the respondent must have intended to discriminate," 
and "inadvertent or accidental discrimination will not violate the title." 110 CONG. REC. 12724 
(1964). 
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 703(j), 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-2(j) (1988). 
39. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 703(h), 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-2(h) (1988). For further discus- 
sion, see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
40. The Act also authorized the Department of Justice to file "pattern or practice" claims of 
systematic discrimination, ? 707, and recognized broad authority in existing state fair employ- 
ment agencies, ?? 706(c),(d), 709(b),(d). 
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the EEOC emerges as the lead actor in pursuing numerical measures 
of equality. 
Surprisingly, while EEOC enforcement efforts and Executive Or- 
der 11,246 demands are rooted in the activist Johnson presidency, the 
Nixon administration proved more than complicit in advancing these 
Johnson initiatives. Graham's tale of the transformation of civil rights 
policy from nondiscrimination to group rights, then, is a story of two 
administrations. Indeed, as The Civil Rights Era amply demonstrates, 
Nixon administration efforts often proved as important as Johnson ini- 
tiatives in cementing both EEOC efforts and the 11,246 program. 
1. The EEOC 
Graham's portrait of the EEOC, albeit incomplete,41 is revealing 
on several fronts. It shows that an agency's nascent stages play an 
extraordinary role in shaping agency policy. Authorizing legislation is 
often a tabula rasa to be fleshed out by the agency through its imple- 
menting regulations and interpretations. In the words of Alfred 
Blumrosen, a key staffer during the EEOC's early years: "A new ad- 
ministrative agency has vast opportunities to demonstrate creative in- 
telligence in its initial decisions. These decisions, made by a handful of 
men and women who comprise the initial staff, reverberate through 
time and space in a tidal wave of consequences for both procedure and 
substance."42 With respect to the EEOC, Graham demonstrates that 
the early years at the agency set in stone critical agency interpretations 
of both its own authority and substantive Title VII law. These inter- 
pretations, moreover, are emblematic of early EEOC efforts to trans- 
form Title VII from what was - according to Jack Greenberg - a 
"weak, cumbersome, [and] probably unworkable" set of provisions43 
into the most powerful civil rights statute. Finally, although this point 
is subject to question,44 Graham concludes that White House indiffer- 
ence allowed the EEOC to be captured by the "increasingly militant 
civil rights constituency."45 
Graham's account also shows that the life of the law is its imple- 
41. See infra note 44. 
42. A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 51 (1971). 
43. P. 189 (quoting Harwood, Battling Job Bias, Wall St. J., May 28, 1965, ? 1, at 1, col. 1). 
44. Indeed, in many instances, the EEOC, not the NAACP, played the lead role in advanc- 
ing broad-ranging interpretations of Title VII. For example, EEOC lawyers initiated the substi- 
tution of disparate impact standard for intent-based proofs. P. 250. In fact, one of the most 
surprising revelations in Graham's account is early NAACP opposition to minority identification 
in institutional records. Although the EEOC intended to monitor equal employment efforts ag- 
gressively through such identification, NAACP officials cautioned that "the minute you put race 
on a civil service form, the minute you put a picture on an application form, you have opened the 
door to discrimination." P. 199. 
45. P. 157. This phenomenon - whether it be described as "capture" or merely extraordina- 
rily amicable relationships between the EEOC and its constituents - is revealed in EEOC efforts 
to assist civil rights organizations in their litigation efforts. P. 244. 
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mentation. Senator Dirksen's efforts to limit the EEOC's role statuto- 
rily to complaint-processing were subverted by artful interpretations 
of Title VII. For example, statutory language disfavoring general re- 
cordkeeping requirements was sidestepped by agency claims that state 
data is too inexact to support systematic national monitoring (pp. 193- 
97). This interpretation was later characterized by Alfred Blumrosen 
as a creative reading of the statute "contrary to the plain meaning."46 
A more striking example is the EEOC's filing of amicus briefs to ex- 
press its substantive views on Title VII law despite Congress' explicit 
prohibition of EEOC-initiated litigation.47 This enabled the EEOC to 
argue in court that Title VII outlawed employer practices "'which 
prove to have a demonstrable racial effect.' "48 The EEOC recognized 
that its "constructive proof of discrimination" reading was at odds 
with explicit statutory language and hence unlikely to receive judicial 
approval.49 To the agency's and the civil rights community's delight 
and surprise, in Griggs v. Duke Power, the Supreme Court validated 
this broad reading.50 
Implementation is a two-edged sword, however. Whereas EEOC 
efforts to eradicate race discrimination reveal the power of aggressive 
enforcement, early EEOC lack of interest in gender discrimination 
made a mockery of this statutory prohibition. As Representative 
Martha Griffiths observed in 1966, the EEOC was "'wringing its 
hands about the sex provision'" so as not to "'interfere with the 
46. P. 195 (quoting A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 42, at 72). Before the EEOC put this broad 
reading into effect, a meeting was arranged to see whether Senator Dirksen would be troubled by 
this breach of the legislative bargain. Dirksen said no, and the reporting system was put into 
place. A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 42, at 73. 
47. See 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-4(gX6) (1988) (1972 Amendments granted EEOC authority to 
intervene in civil actions brought against nongovernment respondents under Title VII; prior to 
these amendments the EEOC was authorized only to refer matters to the Attorney General with 
recommendations for the Attorney General either to intervene or to institute civil actions). 
48. P. 249 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson, EEOC vs. Discrimination, Inc., THE CRISIS, 
Jan. 1968, at 17). The argument's architect was Commission attorney Sonia Pressman. Recog- 
nizing both that her argument was a stretch and that some legitimate personnel decisions would 
come under fire, Pressman advocated that the "active pursuit of an equal opportunity policy" 
necessitated that blacks be "recruited, hired, transferred, and promoted in line with their ability 
and numbers." P. 247 (quoting memo from Pressman to Duncan, May 31, 1966, at 8). This 
revealing discussion of internal agency decisionmaking on this critical question is one of the 
book's highlights. See also H. BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 45-46 (1991) (discussing similar argument advanced by EEOC staff 
member Alfred Blumrosen). 
49. According to Graham, the Commission's administrative history concluded that 
"'[e]ventually this will call for reconsideration of the amendment [requiring proof of intent] by 
Congress'... 'or the reconsideration of [this broad] interpretation by the Commission.' " P. 250 
(quoting EEOC administrative history). 
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Interestingly, the EEOC thought the facts of Griggs favored indus- 
try and hence recommended that the NAACP wait for a less vulnerable case. P. 385. This ex 
parte dialogue between the EEOC and the NAACP is one more example of the identity of inter- 
est between the EEOC and the civil rights community. 
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EEOC's 'main' business of eliminating racial discrimination.' "51 Gra- 
ham's remarkable account of EEOC ambivalence about women-only 
("Jane Crow") classified ads suggests an agency desire to disregard 
initially at least - the sex discrimination prohibition altogether.52 
Although the agency eventually outlawed single-sex ads in 1968 (p. 
231), Graham's account of Jane Crow is a counterpoint to racial en- 
forcement that ironically makes the same point about the right-defin- 
ing nature of the implementation power. 
In addition to the power of both early interpretation and imple- 
mentation, a third key lesson is discernible from The Civil Rights Era: 
the judiciary is a key player in the moder administrative state. Since 
court action and not administrative enforcement governs Title VII, the 
judicial branch plays a leading role in this area. Consequently, by de- 
ferring to early EEOC interpretations of Title VII, the Court enacted 
EEOC's recreation of Title VII - a feat EEOC could not accomplish 
on its own. 
The courts' complicity is revealing in other ways. When Title VII 
was amended in 1972, EEOC chair William Brown and former agency 
official Alfred Blumrosen both preferred agency authority to initiate 
litigation over the granting of "cease and desist" authority to the 
agency. Brown characterized the agency as a civil rights advocate in 
need of an activist forum - specifically, the judiciary.53 Blumrosen, 
emphasizing the dangers of regulatory agencies becoming "captive" to 
the regulated industry, argued that a weaker institutional framework 
(one in which the agency did not have cease and desist authority) en- 
ables civil rights activists to use federal courts "'which are favorable 
to their demands'" (p. 431). Ironically, as Graham describes it, the 
Nixon administration favored judicial enforcement for exactly oppo- 
site reasons, namely, "the Republicans' vintage judicial strategy of 
maximizing the role of adversary proceedings in court so as to mini- 
mize the judgmental discretion of New Dealish regulatory agencies."54 
51. P. 225 (quoting 112 CONG. REC. 13693, 13694 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Griffiths)). For 
further discussion of the tension between race and sex discrimination claims, see pp. 211-18. 
52. The EEOC's November 1965 answer to the problem of sex segregated ads was to require 
that advertisers indicate in the "Jobs of Interest-Female" column whether men were eligible and 
vice-versa. P. 217. The EEOC reasoned that "'[c]ulture and mores, personal inclinations, and 
physical limitations will operate to make many job categories primarily of interest to men or 
women.'" P. 217 (quoting EEOC Chairman Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.). In April 1966, the 
EEOC shockingly modified this weak policy to make it less burdensome on publishers. Pp. 218- 
21. 
By the end of the Johnson administration, however, "the EEOC seemed settled on a path that 
would tightly link race and sex in EEO enforcement." P. 232. 
53. Pp. 429-30. Brown flip-flopped on this matter and eventually came to endorse the more 
traditional "cease and desist" model. P. 433. 
54. Pp. 426-27. Curiously, with the sole exception of Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, 
the Nixon administration never raised doubts about the propriety of strengthening Title VII in 
1972. For Rehnquist's observations, see pp. 424-25. Belz attributes Nixon's "uncritical" accept- 
ance of judicial enforcement "notwithstanding the drastic revision of the law [through court 
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The 1972 amendments, among other things, endorsed the judicial 
enforcement model. They fortified the judiciary's leadership role in 
the Title VII arena. As such, Congress denied itself some of the tradi- 
tional tools of oversight (for example, confirmation, appropriations, 
legislative veto) in shaping the development of Title VII. Congres- 
sional dissatisfaction with substantive judicial rulemaking, instead, 
could only be expressed through statutory amendment.55 Graham, 
although incorrectly presuming an activist judiciary predisposed to 
furthering the interests of civil rights groups,56 correctly characterizes 
the EEOC model as a significant break from traditional regulatory 
structures (pp. 469-70). 
Graham's portrayal of the EEOC reinforces themes well known to 
students of the modem administrative state: the identity of interests 
between interest groups and agencies, the transient nature of original 
legislative intent in the face of conflicting agency priorities, the sweep 
of agency power in its early statutory constructions, policymaking by 
way of resource prioritization, and the power of the judiciary to "cod- 
ify" agency constructions. Graham's depiction also suggests that the 
law as put into effect by an administrative agency may not be a law 
that would receive prior congressional approval. Indeed, the Dirksen 
compromise so central to Title VII's enactment stands in striking con- 
trast to the Griggs-era EEOC. Agency subversion of legislative pur- 
pose is only half of the story told by The Civil Rights Era; the other is 
de facto presidential legislation by way of executive order. 
2. Executive Order 11,246 
The true embodiment of the shift from nondiscrimination to group 
rights is Executive Order 11,246.57 Although numerical disparities 
played a central role in EEOC enforcement, these disparities were 
deemed a proxy for purposeful discrimination. In contrast, the nu- 
merical targets of Executive Order 11,246 are a requirement for con- 
tractors who do business with the federal government. Specifically, 
the order demands an "acceptable" affirmative action program that 
requires adequate "utilization of minorities and women, at all levels 
and in all segments of [the] work force where deficiencies exist."58 
opinion] that was then taking place" to Nixon's preoccupation with "opposing the grant of cease 
and desist authority." H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 73. 
55. During the period of Graham's study, this changed dynamic proved irrelevant, for 
agency and oversight committee desires were furthered by court interpretations. In recent years, 
however, this judicial empowerment has proved the focal point of Title VII enforcement 
controversies. 
56. P. 470. Judicial activism in this area frequently came at the behest of the EEOC. While 
the EEOC and civil rights groups shared the commonality of interests, there is no reason to think 
that the courts were principally beholden to the civil rights community. 
57. See supra note 35. 
58. 41 C.F.R. ? 60-2.10 (1990). Executive Order 11,246 is implemented through regulations known as Revised Order No. 4, which lists eight factors to determine whether there is minority 
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The story of Executive Order 11,246 begins in the final months of 
the Johnson administration. Troubled by racially discriminatory labor 
unions that effectively cut off the supply of minority workers to gov- 
ernment contractors, Department of Labor officials held up contracts 
in Philadelphia and other select industrial cities until contractors ub- 
mitted pledges to hire minority workers (p. 289). The General Ac- 
counting Office, Congress' budgetary watchdog, objected to this 
maneuvering, however. Claiming that the failure to make such 
pledges does not invalidate low bids,59 the GAO argued against " 'the 
creation of a new sub-empire in the DOL without a shadow of authori- 
zation.' "60 In response, the Labor Department rescinded the so- 
called Philadelphia Plan. Indeed, Johnson administration officials ad- 
vised the Nixon transition team that the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCC) was too ineffective to operate indepen- 
dently and recommended that it be transferred from Labor and folded 
into the EEOC (p. 296). 
With the advent of the Nixon administration, the prospects for the 
revitalization of the Philadelphia Plan seemed nonexistent. But revi- 
talize the Plan is precisely what the Nixon administration - including 
the President himself - did. The "why" behind this surprising Nixon 
initiative is brilliantly told by Graham. 
Graham begins by asking the obvious: "Why, then, did such a 
man [who thought affirmative action 'simply would never do any 
good' and] who would appeal to southern and suburban whites on the 
busing issue ... begin his new administration by reviving the liberal 
Democrats' explosively controversial Philadelphia Plan?" (p. 322). 
Two factors seem at work here. First, Nixon Labor Secretary George 
Shultz, after Everett Dirksen's criticisms of the OFCC placed him in a 
defensive posture, decided to respond affirmatively by strengthening 
the OFCC rather than transferring it to the EEOC (pp. 324-25). 
Shultz's solution was to revitalize the Philadelphia Plan. Second, 
President Nixon recognized that Shultz's suggestion created a "polit- 
ical dilemma" for the Democrats, namely, the division of two tradi- 
underutilization, including: (1) the minority population of the labor area surrounding the facil- 
ity, (2) minority unemployment in the surrounding area, (3) availability of minorities with req- 
uisite skills, and (4) potential for training minorities in requisite skills. 41 C.F.R. ? 60-2.11 
(1990). Employers who fail to comply with the order run the risk of losing vital government 
contracts. This threat, of course, is extremely effective. As one contract compliance officer ex- 
plained: "All that is needed is to take the employer to the cliff and say, 'Look over, baby.'" 
Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity Procedures, Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1969). 
59. For an insightful summary of this issue, see Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study 
in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 726-32 (1972). 
60. P. 293 (quoting Melvin E. Miller to J. Edward Welch memo, Dec. 11, 1967). The GAO 
- interested in establishing its final authority to review the legality of federal expenditures 
argued that bidding requirements must be specific and definite. At this time, OFCC - fearing 
Title VII's prohibition of preferential treatment - perceived it could not frame its affirmative 
action demands in terms specific enough to satisfy the GAO. See p. 296. 
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tional Democrat constituencies - labor unions and civil rights groups 
(p. 325). Graham claims Nixon's blatant opportunism here is em- 
blematic of Nixon's approach towards social policy issues: "Lacking 
any internally consistent model of civil rights theory, the Administra- 
tion was free to pursue contradictory policies for short-term tactical 
gains" (p. 302). While this characterization is disputable,61 Graham 
reveals a quite plausible groundwork for this daring initiative. 
The Civil Rights Era provides revealing looks at the saga of Execu- 
tive Order 11,246, the EEOC, voting rights, and other civil rights ini- 
tiatives. In so doing, it provides insightful glimpses into both White 
House management of executive policymaking and congressional-ex- 
ecutive relations. Graham's examination of a twelve-year period also 
permits examination of the role of the president's civil rights vision (or 
lack thereof) in shaping national policy. Kennedy's tentativeness ex- 
plains the lack of progress in his administration; Johnson's assertive- 
ness points to the enactment of significant legislation in 1964, 1965, 
and 1968 as well as aggressive administrative initiatives in the Depart- 
ment of Labor and the EEOC; Nixon's expediency points to compro- 
mise proposals on voting rights legislation and Title VII amendments, 
as well as apparently contradictory positions on busing and Executive 
Order 11,246. Graham, finally, succeeds in offering a historical narra- 
tive which suggests a model of the moder administrative state - leg- 
islation principally designed by Congress and the White House, 
interpretation and implementation by agencies, and court review of 
agency action.62 
Nonetheless, by limiting his focus almost entirely to the enactment 
of critical pieces of legislation or the establishment of White House 
policy, Graham pays a heavy price. The White House's ability to 
oversee agency implementation and, correlatively, agency relations 
with interest groups and oversight committees, are hardly explored in 
The Civil Rights Era. Consequently, despite Graham's assertion that a 
principal focus of the book is the "full policy cycle" with attendant 
lessons about the White House's ability to centralize civil rights en- 
forcement, the book falls short on its promise to examine the full pol- 
icy cycle. 
The balance of this review helps flesh out Graham's central thesis 
about bureaucratic structures and White House control. Part II, by 
highlighting various federal programs that are an outgrowth of the 
1960-1972 era, but are not discussed in The Civil Rights Era, reveals 
the enormous sweep of federal civil rights enforcement, and with it, 
the attendant difficulty of centralization. Part III further considers the 
61. See infra notes 116-25 and accompanying text. 
62. See also Blumrosen, The Crossroads for Equal Employment Opportunity: Incisive Admin- 
istration or Indecisive Bureaucracy, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 46, 47-48 (1973) (proposing a 
similar model for administrative implementation of equal employment opportunity policy). 
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prospects of White House centralization by examining Reagan admin- 
istration efforts in this area. 
II. 1960-1972: THE STORY NOT TOLD 
Graham's account of the civil rights era suggests that the shift 
from individual to group concerns emerged during the latter stages of 
the Johnson presidency and was solidified during the early Nixon 
years. A strong argument can be made, however, that this transforma- 
tion predates the 1964 Civil Rights Act and that it had fully taken 
place prior to the promulgation of the first set of EEOC guidelines in 
1966. In other words, the line separating equality of treatment from 
equality of results was blurred from the start.63 
From the early days of the Kennedy administration, civil rights 
groups advocated race preferences.64 Indeed, while President Ken- 
nedy argued against "hard and fast quotas," he also advised employers 
to "look over employment rolls, look over areas where we are hiring 
people and at least make sure we are giving everyone a fair chance."65 
The seeds of race preference, then, were planted before the 1964 Act. 
With the establishment of the EEOC, civil rights advocates both inside 
and outside of government argued for use of numerical proofs to show 
discrimination. In August 1965, one month after the Commission for- 
mally came into existence, a White House Conference on employment 
discrimination set the tone for EEOC policy.66 Participants included 
civil rights groups, state fair employment commissions, employers, 
and EEOC officials. As Herman Belz's review of the Conference tran- 
script suggests, the conclusion reached - at least by EEOC officials - 
was that "discrimination should be defined as patterns of social and 
economic disadvantage caused by employment practices and social in- 
63. Consequently, the Reagan administration's call to return to mid-1960s "soft" affirmative 
action techniques of recruitment and training is a bit of a misnomer. See Abram, Affirmative 
Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312 (1986). Indeed, reliance on 
"hard" affirmative action techniques such as goals, quotas, and timetables is explainable in part 
by the fact that no good alternatives to such "hard" devices were ever put into effect. 
64. In 1961, a Chicago Urban League official told a congressional committee that "[w]hat we 
need to be is positively color conscious." Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity, Before the 
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 
(1961) (statement of Edwin C. Berry, Executive Director, Chicago Urban League). In 1962, the 
Congress of Racial Equality advocated the employment of a representative number of blacks and 
that black candidates be preferred over equally qualified whites. Equal Employment Opportunity: 
Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211, and S. 1937 Before the Subcomm. on Employment and 
Manpower of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 204-05, 221- 
25 (1963); see also A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVE- 
MENT 1942-1968, at 191-92, 232-35 (1973). See generally H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 7-41. 
65. The President's News Conference of Aug. 20, 1963, reprinted in PUB. PAPERS: JOHN F. 
KENNEDY, 1963, at 633-34. Graham's excerpt from this press conference deletes Kennedy's 
suggestion that employers measure whether they are giving "everyone a fair chance" by 
"look[ing] over employment rolls." See p. 106. 
66. For a comprehensive - albeit biased - review of this Conference, see Where Civil Rights 
Law is Going Wrong, NATION'S BUS., Nov. 1965, at 60. 
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stitutions in general" and consequently employers should "conduct ra- 
cial surveys, generate and publicize profiles of under-representation 
problems, and hire minorities."67 In its report on the Conference, the 
Commission noted that with respect to preferential treatment "the 
question was not whether we are meeting the letter of the law, as per- 
tains to Title VII, but whether we are meeting the spirit of the law."68 
The ultimate embodiment of this sensibility was the EEOC's Au- 
gust 1966 guidelines on employee selection procedures. Although the 
1964 Act excludes from coverage "any professionally developed ability 
test ... not designed, intended or used to discriminate,"69 the EEOC 
guidelines, in preferring the "spirit" to the letter of the law, urged 
employers to recruit minorities and demanded that job screening and 
interviewing be undertaken by individuals fully committed to equal 
employment opportunity.70 The guidelines, moreover, required statis- 
tical validation for any test that rejected blacks at a higher rate than 
whites.71 The key to this aggressive agency posture was a dislike of 
testing. Perceiving that cultural factors may affect performance on 
many employment-related tests, the Commission argued that job per- 
formance and actual job requirements, not test scores, should be the 
focus of hiring decisions.72 Indeed, in 1970, an agency official vowed 
to fight "[t]he cult of credentialism ... in whatever form it occurs."73 
The Civil Rights Era both gives short shrift to early EEOC initia- 
tives and deemphasizes the significance of the early endorsement of 
group rights by civil rights groups. As a result, Graham goes too far 
in suggesting that, over time, the EEOC was captured by its clientele 
interests.74 The truth, instead, is that the EEOC was an agency with a 
mind of its own.75 Graham also errs in suggesting that forces of na- 
ture inexplicably coalesced in the latter stages of the Johnson presi- 
dency and, suddenly, civil rights enforcement was transformed from 
its liberal individualistic base to a group rights approach. While their 
67. H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 28-29. 
68. See Where Civil Rights Law is Going Wrong, supra note 66, at 70. 
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 703(h), 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-2(h) (1988). 
70. See Lyons, An Agency With a Mind of Its Own: The EEOC's Guidelines on Employment 
Testing, NEW PERSP. Fall 1985, at 20, 22; see also H. BELZ, supra note 48 at 116-18. 
71. See Lyons, supra note 70, at 22. 
72. See id. at 21-22. 
73. See id. at 22 (quoting EEOC Chief Psychologist William Enneis). 
74. In addition to the White House Conference and employee testing, EEOC recordkeeping 
requirements support this claim. 
75. This phrase derives from the title of Phil Lyons' article on EEOC testing. See Lyons, 
supra note 70. In saying that the EEOC has a "mind of its own," I do not mean to suggest that 
the EEOC operated in a vacuum. For example, key EEOC staff came from the civil rights com- 
munity. This commonality helps explain the lead role that the EEOC played in advancing the 
agenda of civil rights interest groups. However, the EEOC was not involuntarily "captured" by 
these advocacy groups. This distinction is not merely semantic. A "captured" agency does not 
determine its policy agenda; an agency that sees eye-to-eye with interest groups may well control 
its policy agenda. 
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potency increased over time, the use of numerical proofs seemed evi- 
dent at the 1965 White House Conference. Ironically, the EEOC's 
ability to disregard the delicate political compromise of 1964 lends 
force to Graham's assertions of agency power. Consequently, these 
criticisms suggest that Graham's arguments are even stronger than his 
own presentation reveals. 
Graham's history is also subject to attack for its selectivity. School 
desegregation, the tax exempt status of private schools, and Nixon ad- 
ministration efforts to provide special assistance to minority entrepre- 
neurs are hardly mentioned in this volume. This is unfortunate. 
Aside from being three of the most significant issues of the 1960-1972 
period,76 these topics bear directly on several of The Civil Rights Era's 
central concerns: the rise of numerical measures of equality, executive 
policymaking without legislative authorization, and the rising signifi- 
cance of the dialogue between the judiciary and the elected branches. 
Race and Education. The face of school desegregation was trans- 
formed from 1960 to 1972. In 1960, Brown v. Board of Education's77 
impact was principally symbolic. Indeed, in the decade following 
Brown, less actual desegregation of southern schools occurred than in 
1965 alone.78 The implementation of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),79 coupled with the issuance and en- 
forcement of guidelines for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
marked a significant shift in federal power over state education sys- 
tems.80 Rather than playing a minimalist role in helping schools bet- 
ter educate their students, the federal government became a major 
player in pushing schools to provide equal educational opportunity to 
black children. 
Surprisingly, Title VI, which prevents discriminatory institutions 
from receiving federal dollars, was originally a mere bargaining chip in 
76. Graham, of course, should not be expected to provide a detailed discussion of every civil 
rights issue to emerge from 1960-1972. But he sets out as his objective the examination of bu- 
reaucratic structures and their impact on White House centralization. Cf pp. 5, 7-8. He can, 
therefore, be criticized for failing to examine secondary topics that highlight the principal points 
he makes about Title VII and Executive Order 11,246. Race and education, as well as minority 
business enterprise, are such topics. In view of Graham's "full policy cycle" approach, see supra 
note 14 and accompanying text, as the balance of this section makes clear, these topics are at 
least as important as housing, the ERA, and Kennedy-era developments. 
77. 347 U.S. 483, (1954). 
78. For the 1965-1966 school year, the percentage of black children in biracial schools in the 
11 southern states rose from 2% to 6%. See S. BAILEY & E. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF 
EDUCATION ADMINISTERS A LAW 153 (1968); see also Devins & Stedman, New Federalism in 
Education: The Meaning of Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1243, 1246-51 (1984). 
79. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. ?? 2701-3386 
(1988)). 
80. With these enactments, the primary purpose of federal financial assistance for education 
was no longer to help schools do better what they were already doing; rather, it was to remedy 
their failure to provide equal educational opportunity to black children. See Hartle & Holland, 
The Changing Context of Federal Education Aid, 15 EDUC. & URB. SOCY. 408, 418-21 (1983). 
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the package of civil rights legislation submitted to Congress.81 How- 
ever, with Title VI's demand that federal grant recipients not discrimi- 
nate, Congress became willing to pump billions of dollars of aid for the 
compensatory education of educationally deprived children. (Indeed, 
this conditioning of federal aid upon the nondiscriminatory status of 
the aid recipient prompted strong resistance to ESEA by southern 
members of Congress who were concerned that the money would be 
used to force desegregation.) These billions of dollars were sufficient 
incentive for many school systems to comply with the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) non- 
discrimination standards. 
The story of early enforcement of Title VI by the OCR parallels 
EEOC efforts to strengthen Title VII: agency interpretation in tandem 
with court action mandating change. As OCR read Title VI's legisla- 
tive history, its requirements were consonant with current court rul- 
ings.82 As a result, it interpreted Title VI's desegregation 
requirements as being both flexible and potentially expansive. Regula- 
tions issued by OCR in December 1964 stated that districts would be 
considered in compliance with Title VI if they were subject to a court 
order or if they submitted a desegregation plan subsequently approved 
by the Commissioner of Education.83 As judicial standards developed 
calling for the immediate elimination of dual school systems, and as 
the passage of ESEA in 1965 made Title VI enforcement in southern 
school districts of particular concern to HEW officials, "a device for 
gradual transition" was converted "into an engine of revolution."84 
The initial Title VI guidelines, issued in 1965, required the desegre- 
gation of all grades by 1967.85 In 1966, OCR issued revised guidelines 
setting performance standards for desegregation in affected districts; 
these guidelines also mandated faculty integration.86 The revised 
guidelines set more rigorous standards for freedom of choice plans, 
reflecting increasing concern that these plans were intended primarily 
to maintain dual school systems, not dismantle them.87 
The parallel between the OCR and the EEOC ends here. By the 
third year of Title VI's enforcement, the resistance of state and local 
81. See G. ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION FSOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS 
AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 35, 39 (1969). 
82. See id. at 43, 93. 
83. 21 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 568 (1965). See infra note 85. 
84. G. ORFIELD, supra note 81, at 45. 
85. See CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 83, at 569. They specified that, at a minimum, 
affected districts would have to desegregate four grades (five in some instances) for the 1965-1966 
academic year. Districts could demonstrate their compliance by filing an assurance of compli- 
ance (not acceptable for districts with continuing dual system practices), coming under a court 
order, or filing an acceptable desegregation plan. See id. 
86. See G. ORFIELD, supra note 81, at 146. 
87. See id.; see also SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 92D 
CONG., 2D SESS., TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 196-97 (Comm. Print 1972). 
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officials, as well as congressional restiveness over OCR's heightened 
demands for desegregation, was strong enough to freeze the guidelines. 
No changes were made for the 1967-1968 school year.88 At that time, 
OCR requirements exceeded the requirements of federal court rulings 
on school desegregation.89 
In 1969, with the Nixon administration in office, both the execu- 
tive and legislative branches increasingly opposed the federal courts 
and the OCR on school desegregation questions.90 Increasing empha- 
sis on numerical measures of equality by both the OCR (to measure 
discrimination) and the courts (to remedy discrimination), as well as 
mounting concern over the extension of desegregation to districts 
outside the South and heightened opposition to busing, provoked a 
political reaction ultimately resulting in the taming of federal school 
desegregation enforcement efforts. Congress, with the President's 
blessing, enacted legislation curbing the OCR's enforcement of Title 
VI, particularly with regard to mandatory reassignments.91 
This legislation reveals the obvious; that is, in a true battle between 
elected government and bureaucratic administrators played out on a 
statutory field, elected government will prevail.92 By emphasizing the 
primacy of bureaucratic structures, The Civil Rights Era does not fully 
recognize that Congress (through amending legislation or funding re- 
strictions) and the Executive (through appointments) hold trump 
cards in contests with renegade agencies.93 The manner in which this 
88. See G. ORFIELD, supra note 81, at 258. 
89. The OCR, for example, rejected freedom of choice plans prior to the Supreme Court's 
Green decision. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra 
note 87, at 197. 
90. The Nixon administration, for example, sought to limit OCR enforcement both by 
threatening not to withhold federal funds to ensure Title VI compliance and by instructing the 
OCR - as well as the Department of Justice - that "they are to work with individual school 
districts to hold busing to the minimum required by law." Naughton, Nixon Disavows H.E. W 
Proposal on School Busing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1971, at A15, col. 3. 
91. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1960s, the efforts of the federal government had dramati- 
cally eroded southern school segregation. For example, between 1963 and 1968, the percentage 
of black children in all-black schools in the South dropped from 98% to 25%. G. ORFIELD, 
PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-80, at 5 (1983). 
92. Interestingly, when OCR enforcement waned, civil rights plaintiffs went to court claim- 
ing OCR enforcement inconsistent with Title VI demands. This lawsuit, Adams v. Richardson, 
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), was the first step in the judiciary's "capture" of the OCR. As 
described by Jeremy Rabkin: "Launched in 1970, the case was still generating new briefs and 
new judicial orders at the end of the 1980s, having expanded by then to encompass every facet of 
the enforcement responsibilities of the defendant agency." J. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS 
147 (1989). For a more extensive discussion of this legislation's effect on the OCR, see generally 
id. at 147-81. For an analysis of the related issue of whether the executive can sign onto a 
consent decree which limits the policy discretion of successor administrations, see Rabkin & 
Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decrees: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of 
Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203 (1987). 
93. The all-important dialogue which takes place between agencies and oversight committees 
is strikingly absent from The Civil Rights Era. 
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trump is (or is not) exercised is an important matter not addressed by 
Graham. 
The OCR experience is revealing in quite another way. Despite its 
overt reliance on numerical proofs, the EEOC was not subject to the 
same limitations as the OCR during this period, for Title VII - unlike 
Title VI - was enforced through the courts by private parties. In 
other words, since the EEOC did not directly enforce its interpreta- 
tions of Title VII, the structural relationship between the courts, the 
elected branches, and the agency was different here than with the 
OCR. Where the OCR - like most federal offices - is especially 
vulnerable to presidential appointments and congressional funding, 
the judicial enforcement model of the EEOC provides an important 
layer of insulation between Title VII and elected government.94 The 
Civil Rights Era recognizes this critical distinction (pp. 469-70); but, 
by failing to compare the EEOC to other enforcement agencies, Gra- 
ham's work is inadequate to the task of explaining the relationship 
between bureaucratic structure and agency performance. 
Federal equal educational opportunity enforcement also can be 
contrasted to Title VII enforcement with respect to the related ques- 
tion of tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools. Seg- 
regated private schools, sometimes aided by state subsidies, 
significantly impeded the achievement of nondiscrimination objectives 
in education during the 1960-1972 period (and in the present day).95 
From 1966 to 1972, enrollment in segregated private schools in dis- 
tricts subject to desegregation orders rose from 25,000 to 535,000.96 
Yet before 1970, federal enforcement efforts were generally limited to 
the Title VI prohibition of direct financial assistance to discriminatory 
private schools.97 
The rise of segregated private schools contributed to the racial 
stratification of public education by removing white children from 
public school systems. Making matters worse, the IRS indirectly sup- 
ported this undermining of public school desegregation through tax 
breaks to segregated schools.98 Consequently, in 1967, the U.S. Civil 
94. Another difference is that EEOC enforcement is, for the most part, a factor worked into 
the initial hiring decision. The EEOC influence then affects a limited number of people in an 
undetectable way. In contrast, the busing issue is extraordinarily visible and raises concerns that 
affect everyone, namely, the safety and schooling of children. 
95. See Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS 274 (N. Devins ed. 1989). 
96. See Note, Segregation Academics and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1441 (1973). 
97. One exception to this was a 1967 IRS rule that tax exemptions be denied to schools 
whose operations violate the laws of the United States. I.R.S. News Release, Aug. 2, 1967, re- 
printed in 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) ? 6734. This nondiscrimination policy was of 
limited value, however. Its application extended only to private schools that had contracted with 
the Army to teach the children of Army personnel. 
98. For competing views on the impact of such tax breaks on public school desegregation, 
compare Chemerinsky, supra note 95 with Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination: Federal Regulation 
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Rights Commission urged the Johnson IRS to deny tax breaks to any 
private school practicing racial discrimination.99 The Johnson admin- 
istration, however, concluded that the IRS was without legal authority 
to deny tax exemptions, reasoning that the discriminatory admissions 
practices of private schools violated no law.?00 
The Johnson administration's decision here is puzzling. Although 
the Internal Revenue Code does not specify nondiscrimination as a 
condition of federal tax exempt status, its tax exemption provision 
arguably mandates nondiscrimination through its use of the word 
"charitable"; Title VI's nondiscrimination mandate arguably extends 
to both direct and indirect support; and the Constitution arguably pro- 
hibits indirect governmental support of private discrimination.101 In- 
deed, since the IRS demand would be one of simple 
nondiscrimination, the Johnson IRS position seems somewhat 
surprising. 
The likely explanation for the surface variations in practices of the 
EEOC and the IRS is that the two agencies serve different constituen- 
cies. The EEOC, as Graham demonstrates, sees itself as a civil rights 
advocate. As such, it is predisposed to expand its statutory mandate 
to serve this higher objective. The IRS, in contrast, does not serve this 
constituency and hence is unlikely to place civil rights concerns ahead 
of its interest in effective administration. In fact, by denying reform 
efforts initiated by political factions, the IRS insulates itself from inter- 
est group politics and hence improves its ability to reign over the Tax 
Code. The potentially conflicting objectives of the IRS and the EEOC 
support Graham's assertion that White House centralization of civil 
rights enforcement is a difficult task.'02 Civil rights enforcement cuts 
across all federal agencies. Not surprisingly, each agency will value 
civil rights objectives in light of its other priorities. Consequently, cen- 
tralization in civil rights enforcement demands that the White House 
play an extremely aggressive role - making civil rights a priority at 
the expense of other policy objectives. The Civil Rights Era barely 
hints at this critical attribute of civil rights enforcement. 
The private school tax exemption issue also lends important sup- 
port to Graham's assertion that from 1960-1972 the judiciary emerged 
of Private Education by the Internal Revenue Service, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, 
supra note 95, at 133. 
99. U.S. COMMN. ON CIV. RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1966-67, at 99- 
100 (1967). 
100. See Rabkin supra note 98, at 139. 
101. For a summary of statutory and constitutional arguments on this matter, see Galvin & 
Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 
1368 (1983). 
102. Furthermore, like the EEOC, the OCR was aligned with the civil rights community and 
hence took an aggressive approach in interpreting its Title VI authority. Unlike Title VII en- 
forcement, however, public opposition to expansive school desegregation orders ultimately led to 
the curtailment of OCR power. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93. 
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as a key player in the administrative state. Unlike judicial enforce- 
ment of Title VII, which assisted the EEOC in its efforts to liberalize 
Title VII, the courts played the lead role in reversing the IRS' exten- 
sion of tax breaks to discriminatory schools.103 In 1969, rather than 
seek legislative reversal of the IRS policy through statutory amend- 
ment, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights filed suit, raising statu- 
tory and constitutional objections to the IRS policy. This strategy 
paid off. After a preliminary injunction was issued against the Service, 
the government - reportedly after high level discussions in the White 
House104- reversed its position and announced that it could "no 
longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status to private schools 
which practice racial discrimination .... 105 
This concession, too, seems surprising. After all, the preservation 
of the status quo at the IRS was implicit in Nixon's Southern Strategy 
opposing school desegregation remedies. Yet, after denouncing the 
new IRS policy, southerners began to see the "logic" of the Nixon IRS 
action. Following a meeting with IRS Commissioner Randolph 
Thrower, Mississippi Republican Party Chairman Clark Reed per- 
ceived the IRS announcement as merely symbolic; he announced that 
"[i]f Thrower sticks to his word and is sincere in taking action only to 
offset more extreme court action, no private school... I know of... 
will be without tax exempt status for a single day."106 
This episode reveals, in starker form than anything discussed by 
Graham, the potential reach of judicial authority in the shaping of 
civil rights administration. That the courts should, as Skelly Wright 
put it, fill in the voids where "the elected branches of government 
should have acted and failed"107 portends a type of judicial oversight 
of agency decisionmaking that may well exceed traditional legislative 
oversight. The private school tax exemption affair is proof positive of 
this new judicial role. 
Although Graham pays limited attention to Nixon's Southern 
Strategy, neither the OCR nor the IRS emerges as an actor in The 
Civil Rights Era. Their experiences, however, are revealing both as 
separate tales of civil rights enforcement and as part of a larger mosaic 
of federal civil rights enforcement. Indeed, with respect to Graham's 
103. See generally McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemp- 
tions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 441 (1984) (chronicling court's 
disregard of standing, adverseness, and mootness in federal tax exemption litigation). 
104. Indeed, the White House went out of its way to signal President Nixon's personal in- 
volvement in the decision. See D. WHITMAN, RONALD REAGAN AND TAX-EXEMPTIONS FOR 
RACIST SCHOOLS (1984) (Kennedy School of Government Study). 
105. IRS News Release, July 10, 1970, reprinted in 1970 Stan. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ? 6790. 
106. Reed, Both Sides in South Mistrust Nixon Action on School Integration, N.Y. Times, 
July 16, 1970, at A22, col. 1. 
107. Rabkin, supra note 4, at 34. Wright limits this activism to the "area of equal rights for 
disadvantaged minorities." Id. 
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larger concerns of assessing both White House centralization efforts 
and the advent of the judiciary as a key player in the administrative 
state, race and education issues seem at least as important to The Civil 
Rights Era as housing, the equal rights amendment, and quite possibly 
voting rights. 
Minority Business Enterprise. The Civil Rights Era is strangely 
mute on various Nixon initiatives to encourage minority business en- 
terprise through explicit race preferences.108 These programs demon- 
strate that Executive Order 11,246 was not a fluke. The Nixon 
administration, rather than seek political advantage through endorse- 
ment of a single affirmative action plan, was solidly in the corner of 
race preferences. This commitment to race preferences reinforces 
Graham's assertion that group rights concerns had by 1972 trumped 
equality of opportunity concerns - an assertion, incidentally, that 
grounds Graham's explanation as to why 1960-1972 is an appropriate 
period to study. Indeed, since numerical proofs of discrimination uti- 
lized in Title VII and voting can be characterized as measurements of 
purposeful discrimination,109 and since Executive Order 11,246 - ac- 
cording to Graham's account - seems a political anomaly, some dis- 
cussion of minority business enterprises seems necessary to make 
airtight Graham's group rights claim. 
In 1953, Congress created the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), an agency which by contracting - under its section 8(a) au- 
thority - with government agencies to set aside work for SBA-desig- 
nated small businesses"? ensured the award of government contracts 
to small businesses. At that time, the focus of SBA section 8(a) efforts 
was race-neutral economic development. With Congress' enactment 
in 1967 of legislation designed to assist economically disadvantaged 
small business,"' the SBA set-aside program began to change focus. 
In June 1969, the SBA had created an Office of Business Development 
to "deal with the complex problems involved in effectively using the 
authority of section 8(a).""2 In November 1970, SBA regulations 
108. Graham's discussion is limited to a brief two-page discussion of the Office of Minority 
Business Enterprises. Pp. 314-16. 
109. Proponents of numerical proofs of discrimination claim that the inadequacy of the in- 
tent standard as an accurate gauge of discrimination necessitates the use of numerical measures. 
See, e.g., Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989). 
110. 15 U.S.C. ? 637a (1982). My discussion of the Small Business Administration draws 
heavily from P. Lyons, The Small Business Administration's Section 8(a) Set-Aside Program 
(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with author). See also Levinson, A Study of Preferential 
Treatment: The Evolution of Minority Business Enterprise Assistance Programs, 49 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 61 (1980). 
111. Small Bus. Act Amends. of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-104, 81 Stat. 268 (1967). 
112. Small Business and Labor Surplus Area Set-Asides and 8(a) Subcontracts: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Government Procurement of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970) (statement of Edward N. Odell, Acting Deputy Director, Office of 
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specified program eligibility to firms owned by "socially or economi- 
cally disadvantaged persons," that is, a category of owners of firms 
that "includes, but is not restricted to, Black Americans, American 
Indians, Spanish Americans, Oriental Americans, Eskimos and 
Aleuts."'13 Although these criteria technically did not prohibit 
nonminority participation in the 8(a) program, a 1978 SBA report in- 
dicated that ninety-six percent of 8(a) participants were minority- 
owned firms.114 
This minority specification was rooted in a rather creative reading 
of the 1967 statute. The SBA assumed that, by referring to "low 
income" individuals in the statute, Congress' concern was not sim- 
ply economic disadvantage but also social disadvantage. In addi- 
tion, the SBA assumed, as SBA head Thomas Kleppe put it, that 
"'minority' is a shorthand for the phrase 'socially or economically 
disadvantaged.' "115 
This feat of statutory construction, which certainly matches EEOC 
interpretations of Title VII in audacity, was encouraged by the White 
House. Between March 1969 and October 1971, President Nixon is- 
sued three executive orders to "help establish and promote minority 
business." The creation of the Office of Minority Business Enter- 
prise"16 within the Department of Commerce and the call for in- 
creased representation of "Minority Business Enterprises" within 
federal departments and agencies17 were the byproduct of these exec- 
utive orders. Moreover, in 1971, a President's Advisory Council Re- 
port advocated that minorities be provided "a substantially increased 
stake in the American economy,"118 for "[t]he unique historical expe- 
rience of... disadvantaged minorities ... cannot be ignored in shap- 
ing a national effort to produce substantial new entrepreneurial 
activity.""9 The Nixon administration then, as Phil Lyons puts it, 
was "determined to act on its conviction that some groups in our soci- 
Business Development, Small Business Administration, Washington, D.C., accompanied by Clif- 
ford J. Hawley, District Director, Small Business Administration, Albuquerque, New Mexico). 
113. 13 C.F.R. ? 124-8.1(c) (1971). 
114. ? 8(A) REVIEW BOARD, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, REPORT AND RECOM- 
MENDATIONS ON THE SECTION 8(A) PROGRAM FOR A. VERNON WEAVER, ADMINISTRATOR, 
SBA 23 (1978); see also Levinson, supra note 110, at 66. 
115. Government Minority Small Business Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Mi- 
nority Small Business Enterprise of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5 (1971) [hereinafter Small Business Hearings] (testimony of Thomas S. Kleppe, Adminis- 
trator, Small Business Administration, accompanied by John A. Knebel, General Counsel, and 
Arthur McZier, Assistant Administrator for Minority Enterprise). 
116. Exec. Order No. 11,458, 34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969); see also Exec. Order No. 11,625, 3 
C.F.R. 616 (1971) (authorizing OMBE to provide financial assistance to organizations "so that 
they may render technical and management assistance to minority business enterprises"). 
117. Exec. Order No. 11,518, 3 C.F.R. 907 (1970). 
118. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, MINORITY 
ENTERPRISE AND EXPANDED OWNERSHIP: BLUEPRINT FOR THE 70S 5 (1971). 
119. Id. at 10. 
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ety, due to no fault of their own, had not enjoyed economic progress in 
comparison to other groups."120 
In 1971, efforts to curtail the SBA program were launched in Con- 
gress and the courts. Senate and House oversight committees both 
heard that the minority designation was without statutory authoriza- 
tion.121 Yet, perhaps because committee members were sympathetic 
to the SBA section 8(a) program,122 little real pressure was placed on 
the SBA and, in 1978, Congress codified the section 8(a) program.'23 
In court, a constitutional reverse discrimination challenge ultimately 
failed because of plaintiffs' lack of standing.124 
The SBA section 8(a) program and minority business enterprise 
executive orders are revealing on several fronts. First, the Nixon ad- 
ministration's commitment to these programs demonstrates the preva- 
lence of the group rights approach in the early 1970s. Although the 
Nixon administration's full throttle commitment to increasing both 
minority enterprise and minority employment suggests - contrary to 
Graham - that Nixon's support of civil rights was more real than 
superficial,125 Graham's thesis regarding the dominance of group 
rights concerns ultimately would benefit from a more forceful presen- 
tation of the solidification of affirmative action largesse in the Nixon 
era. Second, the explicit designation of groups other than blacks as 
program beneficiaries is a development of extraordinary significance. 
Politically, broadening the base of the beneficiaries proved critical to 
the near deferential approach of oversight committees to the section 
8(a) program. Yet over time, this legitimation of a racial spoils system 
led to vigorous battles between in and out groups over their fair share 
of this government pie.126 This ancillary phenomenon exemplifies the 
shift to group rights, for these battles made mockeries of both the 
120. P. Lyons, supra note 110, at 27. 
121. See Small Business Hearings, supra note 115, at 35 (Rep. Robinson's criticism of the 
minority designation); SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FEDERAL SPENDING PRACTICES AND OPEN 
GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, REPORT BASED ON HEAR- 
INGS AND INQUIRIES CONDUCTED ON THE SBA INVOLVING ABUSES IN THE 8(A) PROGRAM 4 
(Comm. Print 1978) (" 'Social or economic disadvantage' is a phrase initiated by SBA's Office of 
General Counsel to step around the constitutional questions raised by the 8(a) program.") 
122. Cf P. Lyons, supra note 110, at 30-33 (discussing committee members' advocacy of 
minority interests). 
123. Pub. L. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757-73 (1978). For further discussion, see Levinson, supra 
note 110, at 84-94. 
124. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 709-10 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974). At the district court level, however, plaintiffs prevailed on the 
merits. 334 F. Supp. 194 (1971). 
125. See also H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 35 (Nixon pressed employment equality in Eisen- 
hower administration), at 38-39 (Philadelphia Plan support rooted in belief in minority economic 
development), at 94-95 (SBA 8(a) program). 
126. Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 42,832 (1979) (granting presumptive disadvantaged status to 
Asian-Pacific Americans) with 45 Fed. Reg. 25,563 (1980) (denying presumptive status to 
Hasidic Jews). 
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ethos of individualism (which views as morally offensive the treatment 
of individuals as members of a group) and of remedial principles 
(which would draw sharp lines between blacks and other minority 
groups based on differing degrees of discrimination suffered at the 
hands of government). Third, an agency's ability to use its authorizing 
statute as a creative license is well-illustrated in SBA interpretations of 
its section 8(a) authority. This story reinforces Graham's central les- 
son about the EEOC. Fourth, although not as dramatic or significant 
as Executive Order 11,246, presidential executive order power is also 
illustrated here. Fifth and finally, the role of the courts and legislative 
oversight committees is again revealed here. That the challenges 
sought to limit group rights decisionmaking and that the challenges 
failed also point to the solidification of the group rights approach. 
* * * 
Minority business enterprise, race and education, and employment 
testing strengthen Graham's central contentions about the ascendancy 
of group rights and the ability of agencies to transform legislative pri- 
orities. These issues also are instructive in stating the complex in- 
terchange that takes place between the agency, interest groups, the 
White House, and Congress. The Civil Rights Era, with its "full policy 
cycle" emphasis, would have been well served by the inclusion of these 
topics. 
III. REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WHITE 
HOUSE CENTRALIZATION 
The explicit and implicit conclusions of The Civil Rights Era sug- 
gest an enfeebled presidency. Graham gives several reasons for this. 
First, the "full policy cycle" reveals that career bureaucrats, not polit- 
ical appointees, ultimately hold the key in the running of government 
agencies (p. 7). Second, triangular power relationships that form 
among an agency, its legislative oversight committee, and its constitu- 
ent interests effectively foreclose active White House involvement in 
the running of government (p. 470). Third, to the extent that agencies 
disregard constituent interests, the judiciary will likely impose these 
constituent desires on agencies (p. 470). Fourth, agency power is at its 
apex immediately after the enactment of legislation. During this pe- 
riod, agency statutory interpretations - validated by court opinions 
- shape the meaning of legislation into a form acceptable to the 
agency.127 Correlatively, although Graham does not make this point, 
agencies are circumscribed in their ability to "recreate" their legisla- 
tive mandate once court opinions cement agency constructions. In 
other words, a White House that inherits a preexisting enforcement 
scheme has rather limited options. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 42-53. 
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Graham's proof of these propositions is wanting. Furthermore, 
some of these propositions are suspect. While it is indisputable that 
careerist attorneys in both the Justice Department and the EEOC 
helped shape agency policy, there is no reason to suspect that these 
policy directions were not in accord with the desires of political ap- 
pointees. In fact, the Nixon and Johnson administrations' support of 
sweeping civil rights initiatives suggests just the opposite. Moreover, 
even if careerists unilaterally shaped policy in the Nixon and Johnson 
years, that does not mean that a president ideologically opposed to this 
careerist vision could not retool the agency to suit his priorities. For 
example, President Reagan sought to undertake such a retooling in 
several government agencies. 
Graham's failure to discuss relationships between oversight com- 
mittees and either agencies or interest groups is also problematic be- 
cause it makes his assertion about "iron triangles" pure speculation. 
Moreover, the mere potential that such triangular relationships may 
form does not mean that that potential will be realized. During the 
Reagan years, for example, relationships between agencies, on the one 
hand, and oversight committees128 and interest groups129, on the other 
hand, were often testy. Finally, although the courts often impose con- 
stituent views on agencies, courts - at least during the Reagan years 
- sometimes prefer the White House's view.130 
These criticisms of Graham's proof do not mean that Graham's 
ultimate conclusions about the difficulties of White House centraliza- 
tion are in error. Early agency interpretations are extraordinarily in- 
fluential, careerists do remain after a president's term is complete, 
courts do order agencies to comply with constituent interests claims, 
and oversight committees do exert tremendous power over agencies. 
In addition to the vast array of federal programs and agencies in need 
of coordination, these phenomena stand as roadblocks to White House 
centralization efforts. These roadblocks, however, do not foreclose 
White House influences; instead, they deny presidential supremacy 
and force the administration to supplement traditional policymaking- 
through-rulemaking with such back door policymaking devices as ap- 
pointments, agency reorganization and policy prioritization.'31 
Although such policymaking devices are necessarily transitory (for 
subsequent administrations can exercise the powers of appointment, 
128. See infra notes 160, 162, 174-79, 187 and accompanying text. 
129. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
130. Compare Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but the 
Shouting, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 524 (1987) (Reagan Department of Justice attack on affirmative 
action soundly defeated by Supreme Court) with Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 
Texas L. Rev. 353, 378 (1989) ("[V]iewed as a mosaic, the cases leave unanswered many ques- 
tions about the scope of permissible affirmative action."). 
131. See infra notes 180-94 and accompanying text. 
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policy prioritization, and reorganization to displace their predecessor's 
objectives), they play quite a large role in civil rights enforcement. 
The reaches and limits of White House civil rights efforts can be 
seen in Reagan's efforts to centralize civil rights policy. Reagan took 
office at the height of federal efforts to impose numerical measures of 
equality. During the Carter years, existing programs, such as Execu- 
tive Order 11,246 and section 8(a), were strengthened132 and numer- 
ous race- and gender-conscious initiatives were launched throughout 
federal departments and agencies.133 Reagan made opposition to these 
Carter initiatives a centerpiece of his campaign, arguing that "equal 
opportunity should not be jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and 
decisions which rely on quotas, ratios, and numerical requirements to 
exclude some individuals in favor of others, thereby rendering such 
regulations and decisions inherently discriminatory."134 
The manner in which Reagan sought to effect change is also signifi- 
cant. In addition to the appointment of like-minded individuals,'35 
Reagan intended to reestablish the White House as the locus of federal 
power. Almost immediately after assuming office, Reagan formed a 
Task Force on Regulatory Relief. 36 The byproduct of this task force 
was the creation of an entity within the White House, the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), to screen all agency 
rulemaking.137 The Reagan White House then appeared ready, will- 
132. See P. Lyons, supra note 110, at 46-52 (discussing 8(a) program under Carter); Clark, 
Affirmative Action May Fall Victim to Reagan's Regulatory Reform Drive, NATL. J., July 11, 
1981, at 1248, 1250. 
133. See generally Finn, "Affirmative Action" Under Reagan, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1982, at 
17, 18-20. Carter initiatives included efforts to demand adequate minority student representation 
in tax-exempt private schools, 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978); the granting of preferences to minor- 
ity broadcasters, Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 
F.C.C. 2d 979 (1978); the establishment of a minority business enterprise set aside for Depart- 
ment of Transportation highway programs, Department of Transportation Order No. 4000.7A, 
43 Fed. Reg. 20, 883 (1978); and the EEOC's 1978 Uniform Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295 
(1978) and 43 Fed. Reg. 38,312 (1978). 
134. 1980 Republican Platform, reprinted in 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 50-B, 62-B (1980). 
Compare 1980 Democratic Platform, reprinted in 36 Cong. Q. Almanac 91-B, 105-B ("[A]n ef- 
fective affirmative action program is an essential component of our commitment to expanding 
civil rights protections."). Reagan, moreover, did not change his rhetoric once in office. 
135. The Reagan administration made commitment to an antiregulatory agenda, rather than 
substantive expertise in the relevant program, the critical prerequisite to presidential nomination. 
See G. EADS & M. Fix, RELIEF OR REFORM?: REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA 140-46 
(1984). The consequence of this strategy was that Congress failed to support regulatory reform 
efforts requiring the granting of discretion in program heads. Id. at 146-48. 
136. White House Report, Program for Economic Recovery, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
Doc. 138, 151 (Feb. 18, 1981). 
137. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 12 (1982). For competing perspectives on this execu- 
tive order, compare Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of 
Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981) (executive 
order unconstitutionally subverts Congress' legislative primacy) with Demuth & Ginsberg, White 
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986) (defending executive or- 
der). Interestingly, Congress threatened to cut off federal funding of OIRA due to the 
overpoliticization of the review process. See Havermann, 'Defunding' O.M.B. 's Rule Reviewers, 
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ing, and able to tackle the Carter legacy of expansive race-conscious 
programs and regulations. 
Once in office, however, the Reagan Administration's pursuit of its 
equal opportunity platform proved far from clear. This lack of clarity 
evidences real limits in White House centralization efforts. Curiously, 
one of the best demonstrations that the president is powerful but not 
omnipotent is that Reagan civil rights policy came under attack from 
both the left and the right. From the right, Jeremy Rabkin, pointing 
to the administration's support of numerous affirmative action pro- 
grams, accused the Reagan administration of "wring[ing] what[ever] 
partisan advantage it can from the pattern of racial and ethnic spoils 
established in the 1970s."138 Chester E. Finn, Jr., put the matter more 
succinctly when he observed that "[t]he most ideological administra- 
tion in recent history seems not to have its ideas sorted out"; instead 
Reagan civil rights policy depended "more than it should on what day 
it is, who is in charge of a particular decision, what constituency is 
raising the loudest ruckus, and which agency is responsible for formu- 
lating the alternatives and executing the decision."139 
Criticism did not come only from the right. Indeed, the Reagan 
administration has been savaged by the left. Norman Amaker con- 
cludes that the Reagan civil rights record "reflects an energizing, con- 
sistent philosophical view .... That view is one that eschews any 
attention to the historical roots of race and sex discrimination ... [but 
focuses instead] on the present intent of alleged discriminatory con- 
duct."'40 Correlatively, during the Reagan years, the civil rights com- 
munity issued numerous reports condemning the administration. The 
liberal attacks targeted Reagan's opposition to voting rights reform 
and the Civil Rights Restoration Act; Reagan's attempts to grant tax 
breaks to discriminatory private schools and to reconstitute the Civil 
Rights Commission in his own image; appointees to the Federal Com- 
munications Commission, Department of Education, and EEOC who 
questioned the Carter legacy; and - most important - the granting 
of carte blanche authority to the Department of Justice to launch a 
frontal assault on numerical measures of equality.141 
The Reagan administration's mixed record, while inviting criticism 
Wash. Post, July 18, 1986, at A17, col. 1. After this threat, OIRA agreed to modify its review 
procedures. 
138. Rabkin, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1985, at 15, 17. Specifically, 
Rabkin pointed to Department of Labor enforcement of Executive Order 11,246, the Depart- 
ment of Education's use of numerical proofs of discrimination, the EEOC's demand that federal 
agencies maintain affirmative action hiring plans, and minority business enterprise programs in 
the Small Business Administration as well as the Department of Commerce. 
139. Finn, supra note 133, at 28. 
140. N. AMAKER, supra note 10, at 161. 
141. See generally LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITHOUT JUSTICE 75 
(1982); WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF LAWYERS, REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS: THE FIRST TWENTY 
MONTHS 5-6 (1982); Finn, supra note 133, at 17. 
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from both sides, seems inevitable. First, federal civil rights enforce- 
ment sweeps throughout the executive branch; hence, effective White 
House coordination is almost impossible. Unless a president makes 
civil rights enforcement he benchmark of his administration, disconti- 
nuity seems unavoidable. Second, once a law is enacted and the initial 
implementing regulations promulgated, it is extraordinarily difficult o 
reconsider en masse the enforcement schemes of prior administrations. 
Oversight committee and constituency interest opposition is simply 
too formidable here. Consequently, secondary devices such as reor- 
ganization and policy prioritization - which do not directly attack 
existing regulations - are often the best mechanism for change avail- 
able to the White House. Third, reliance on such secondary devices 
limits a president's civil rights legacy. Successor administrations can 
easily reset priorities and reorganize agencies. The Reagan experience 
supports each of these propositions and hence reveals the inherent lim- 
its of White House centralization. The balance of this section will con- 
sider these three matters in turn, portraying Graham's central 
assertions about the difficulty of White House centralization, the im- 
port of early agency interpretations, and the power of other players- 
courts, oversight committees, and interest groups - as truisms of the 
moder presidency. 
The Improbability of Centralization. Every government agency, 
department, and commission is in the business of civil rights enforce- 
ment. Title VI requirements are enforced by all government agencies 
distributing federal largess;142 EEOC regulations call for sensitivity by 
all government agencies to numerical equality objectives in their own 
hiring.143 Moreover, freestanding civil rights enforcement projects ex- 
ist within the EEOC, SBA, FCC, Civil Rights Commission (CRC), the 
Legal Services Corporation (LSC), and the Departments of Treasury, 
Labor, Education, Commerce, Transportation, and Justice.'44 Given 
the pervasiveness of civil rights enforcement, centralization can occur 
only if the White House both makes coordination a primary objective 
and is extremely diligent in appointing to key government posts indi- 
viduals who agree with the president's views on civil rights enforce- 
ment. Otherwise, competing regulatory agenda items will take 
precedence over civil rights enforcement and, correlatively, external 
142. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 602, 42 U.S.C. ? 2000d-I (1982). 
143. "EEOC had cited ? 717(B)(1) of Title VII and Executive Order 11,748 as requiring 
Federal agency equal employment opportunity plans, including affirmative action goals, to be 
reviewed and evaluated by EEOC." 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at n. 313 (citing Clarence 
Thomas, speech before NASA Equal Opportunity Council Meeting, Hampton, Va. 10-11 (May 
26, 1983)). 
144. With the exception of the Legal Service Corporation, these programs are discussed 
throughout this review. For a discussion of Legal Services in the Reagan era, see Wallace, Out of 
Control: Congress and the Legal Service Corporation, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY 169 (L. 
Crowitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989). 
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pressures from oversight committees and constituency interests will 
dilute the White House agenda. 
Reagan White House civil rights centralization efforts clearly suf- 
fered from internal and external coordination problems. Internal 
problems derived from the existence of several competing strategies of 
regulatory relief within the executive. The most visible strategy 
commonly associated with the Department of Justice in general and 
Civil Rights Division head William Bradford Reynolds in particular 
- was moralistic and rhetorically divisive. It viewed preferential 
treatment "based on nothing more than personal characteristics of 
race or gender ... as [just as] offensive to standards of human decency 
today as it was some 84 years ago when countenanced under Plessy v. 
Ferguson ... ."145 It was also confrontational, calling for immediate 
and massive judicial, regulatory, and legislative reform.146 
The willingness of Justice to launch a frontal assault on numerical 
proofs of discrimination and nonvictim relief is unique, however. The 
preferred strategy of other civil rights enforcement agencies147 
EEOC, OFCC, and OCR - was to leave existing programs on the 
books but to limit the effectiveness of those programs through a vari- 
ety of enforcement strategies. Furthermore, agencies not principally 
in the business of civil rights enforcement - even if sympathetic to the 
Justice Department's moral imperative - focused their attentions on 
other regulatory initiatives. Reagan FCC appointees, for example, 
were willing to hold their opposition to minority race preferences in 
check in order to advance their deregulatory agenda. Finally, at least 
with respect to minority business enterprise programs housed in the 
Small Business Administration as well as the Departments of Trans- 
portation and Commerce, the Reagan administration and its appoin- 
tees favored some of the affirmative action initiatives launched by 
Presidents Nixon and Carter.'48 
These varied strategies ensured a certain degree of disunity in Rea- 
145. Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action, 1981: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the Comm. on Education and 
Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 131, 137 (1981) (citation omitted) (statement of William 
Bradford Reynolds); see also Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 
93 YALE L.J. 995, 998-1001 (1984) (individual rights best protected through race-neutral 
means). 
146. This vision shares common ground with ideological attacks on social regulation 
launched at the Equal Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 135, at 
256-57. Specifically, appointees were chosen for ideological opposition to the Carter administra- 
tion's regulatory agenda, not substantive expertise with the programs they were to administer; 
appointees viewed the agency's permanent career professionals as the enemy; and appointees 
were willing to place commitment to an ideological vision ahead of marginal change premised 
upon the propriety of scaling down current programs. Id. at 142-43. 
147. See infra notes 180-94 and accompanying text. 
148. See Pear, Administration Challenges Plan by Rights Panel, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986, 
at Al, col. 2. 
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gan civil rights policies. Ironically, this disunity can be explained, in 
part, by efforts towards White House centralization. Most significant, 
"movement conservatives" at Justice and the White House saw them- 
selves in the midst of a holy war that required uniform adherence to 
the Justice creed.149 As caricatured by former Education Secretary 
T.H. Bell, these "extremists" would say: "Let the chaos come .... 
This is part of the revolution! Pragmatism is cowardice and weak- 
ness!"150 In the end, however, this absolutist approach undermined 
any chance of effective White House centralization. 
The keys to this failure are three extraordinary policy blunders 
made by the President at the urging of the Department of Justice. 
First, Reagan's ostensible commitment to simple nondiscrimination 
was called into question when his administration sought in 1982 to 
restore the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private 
schools.151 Second, in the midst of this fiasco, Reagan announced his 
opposition to provisions of the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments 
which make disparate racial impact an important evidentiary tool in 
voting rights cases.152 In explaining the administration's position, a 
"hearing room full of civil-rights activists erupted into laughter" when 
Attorney General Smith remarked that "the President doesn't have a 
discriminatory bone in his body."'53 Third, in 1983, President Reagan 
(unsuccessfully) sought to remove Mary Frances Berry and two of her 
colleagues from the allegedly "independent, bipartisan" U.S. Commis- 
sion on Civil Rights.154 In their stead, Reagan advanced three nomi- 
nees who, according to Reagan, "don't worship at the altar of forced 
busing and mandatory quotas" and "don't believe you can remedy 
past discrimination by mandating new discrimination."155 Although 
he had good reason to be fed up with the Commission's partisan at- 
tacks on his administration,156 Reagan's efforts here, as Senator Ed- 
ward Kennedy put it, appeared to be "an unprecedented assault on the 
independence and integrity of the Civil Rights Commission."157 
The costs of these three blunders to White House centralization 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46. 
150. Bell, Education Policy Development in the Reagan Administration, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 
Mar. 1986, at 487, 491 [hereinafter Bell, Education Policy]; see also T. BELL, THE THIRTEENTH 
MAN 99-113 (1988). 
151. I.R.S. News Release, Jan. 8, 1982. 
152. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 ? 2, 42 U.S.C. ? 1973b (1982). 
153. Finn, supra note 133, at 27. 
154. See President Fires Three Members of U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA), at A-l (Oct. 25, 1983). See generally Nomination Hearings, supra note 12. 
155. See Weisman, Reagan Defends 3 Nominations to Rights Panel, N.Y. Times News Serv., 
Aug. 1, 1983, reprinted in Nomination Hearings, supra note 12, at 501. 
156. See Letter from U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to the Vice President, 1 (Feb. 12, 
1982) ("The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights views with increasing alarm efforts to end Federal 
leadership in promoting equal educational opportunity."); Finn, supra note 133, at 24-25. 
157. Nomination Hearings, supra note 12, at 219 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
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were enormous. Pragmatists within the administration thought it po- 
litically unwise for the White House itself to expend further political 
capital in this area. Furthermore, Reagan appointees at other agencies 
witnessed and learned from these events that confrontational politics 
comes at a high cost. Consequently, although kamikaze pilots at the 
Department of Justice were allowed to continue their mission, neither 
the White House nor other agencies would assist them in it.158 
External pressures, principally in the form of legislative oversight, 
also stood in the way of White House centralization. The EEOC's 
experience was typical. Despite stated objections to both affirmative 
action remedies and the 1978 Uniform Guidelines,'59 the EEOC never 
formally modified preexisting Carter EEOC regulations. Repeated 
oversight hearings,'60 Government Accounting Office investigations 
(and threats thereof),161 committee reports,162 confirmation hear- 
ings,163 and the power of the purse all moderated the agency's behav- 
ior.'64 For example, EEOC chair Clarence Thomas explicitly 
158. This apparent discord is best explained by Reagan's noninterventionist approach to 
managing department heads. See Bell, Education Policy, supra note 150, at 490. Ironically, Jus- 
tice's efforts to impose its imprimatur on Reagan civil rights enforcement undermined a more 
modest and potentially successful approach. Recurring enforcement strategies of the Reagan 
administration generally eschewed repudiation of existing programs in favor of, as George Eads 
and Michael Fix observed, "adoption of a new and more exclusive screening criteria for identify- 
ing potential violators; unwillingness to test new legal or economic theories that might expand 
the existing classes of violators; [and] reduced discretion for field enforcement personnel .. .." 
G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 135, at 193-94. This more modest approach would have been less 
subject to political attack and, consequently, might have withstood oversight committee and 
constituency group pressure. 
159. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Policies Regarding Goals and Timeta- 
bles in Litigation Remedies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the 
House Comm on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1986) (statement of Clarence 
Thomas, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) ("[N]umerically based reme- 
dies which focus on sex, race or ethnic considerations have the potential to undermine the ulti- 
mate goals of nondiscrimination embodied in Title VII."); see also Hearings, supra note 7, at 354 
(statement of C. Thomas). 
160. During the Reagan years, Congress held many oversight hearings each year. See gener- 
ally 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-44. Moreover, there were numerous informal con- 
tacts between the oversight committees and the EEOC. 
161. See GAO, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES (1981); GAO, INQUIRY INTO ALLEGED OPERATING AND MAN- 
AGEMENT PROBLEMS IN EEOC's OFFICE OF REVIEW AND APPEALS (1982); Letter from Rep. 
Augustus Hawkins to Comptroller General Charles Bowsher (July 15, 1985) (requesting GAO 
investigation). 
162. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 7. 
163. See, e.g., Nomination of Clarence Thomas, of Missouri, to be Chairman of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human 
Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings]; Nomination of Jeffrey Ira 
Zuckerman, of Virginia, to be General Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis- 
sion: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1986). 
164. Congress' power of the purse is best revealed in the EEOC's annual budget submission 
and the corresponding oversight hearings which accompany that submission. See generally 1987 
CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-44. 
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endorsed the use of goals and timetables, despite his personal objec- 
tions, at Senate reconfirmation hearings.165 Indeed, on several occa- 
sions, the EEOC locked horns with the Department of Justice on the 
numerical equality issue.166 Moreover, despite the White House's sug- 
gestion that the 1978 guidelines were inefficient, the EEOC left the 
guidelines alone,167 apparently because the political costs of revision 
were too high.168 
The failure of the Reagan White House to centralize civil rights 
enforcement is not surprising. Despite Reagan's alleged ideological vi- 
sion and his attempts to centralize government regulation,169 numer- 
ous internal and external pressures undermined a coordinated civil 
rights enforcement strategy. Some of these pressures are endemic to 
all administrations. For example, the inevitably divergent interests of 
government agencies and departments had previously doomed John- 
son (pp. 44, 64), Kennedy (pp. 181-84, 192), and Carter'70 administra- 
tion efforts at interagency coordination. However, some of the 
problems the Reagan administration faced were unique unto it. An 
overly ideological group of "movement conservatives," Reagan's reli- 
ance on delegating authority to like-minded individuals to accomplish 
centralization objectives,'71 and the simple fact that the Reagan ad- 
ministration was swimming against the political current'72 were cir- 
165. See Thomas Hearings, supra note 163, at 44. 
166. These disputes concerned Justice's representation of the EEOC before the Supreme 
Court, intervention in lower federal court cases in which the EEOC was a party, and refusal to 
comply with EEOC affirmative action guidelines for federal agencies and departments. See 1987 
CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 40-42; see also Letter from Clarence Thomas to Attorney General 
Smith reprinted in Hearing before Subcommittee on Constitutional and Civil Rights, House Judici- 
ary Committee, May 6, 1983. 
167. See Barringer, Job Bias Debate is Reopened, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1981, at A27, col. 2; 
1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 24. 
168. OIRA's influence was more profound in deterring the EEOC from adopting expansive 
age discrimination regulations. After the EEOC in 1984 decided to apply the Age Discrimina- 
tion in Employment Act to apprenticeship training programs, OIRA returned the rule to the 
agency "expressing concern that prohibiting apprenticeship programs [from] imposing age limits 
might prevent employers from recovering the cost of training." Selected Statements Delivered 
January 28, 1988 to the House Select Committee on Aging, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 19, at E- 
1 (Jan. 28, 1988) (testimony of Clarence Thomas). In 1987, the EEOC formally concurred with 
OIRA on this matter. See id. 
169. See generally 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 40-42, 61, 71, 93-4, 100. 
170. See U.S. COMMN. ON Civ. RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EF- 
FORT - 1977, TO ELIMINATE MPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A SEQUEL 331 (1977) (federal 
agencies disagreed with each other "as to the meaning of discrimination and how discrimination, 
once identified, should be remedied."); J. CALIFANO, supra note 31, at 240-41 (describing con- 
flicts within Carter administration strategy in Bakke litigation); L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIALOGUES 27 n.68 (1988) (describing conflicts between White House and Department of Jus- 
tice); Kneeland, Sears Sues U.S. over Job Bias Laws, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1979, at Al, col. 1 
(Sears charged the federal government with promulgating conflicting requirements in federal 
employment law.). 
171. But see supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
172. Indeed, even business - presumably saddled with the burdens of affirmative action 
opposed Reagan initiatives here. Cf. H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 196-200; Seligman, Affirmative 
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cumstances peculiar to the Reagan administration. 
That the Reagan administration did not speak with one voice high- 
lights the difficulty of coordinating civil rights policy in the modem 
administrative state. That difficulty, however, contrary to Graham's 
suggestion, does not mean that the White House is without substantial 
power in this area. 
Administrative Discretion to Alter Regulatory Policymaking. The 
Reagan experiment tells a very revealing story about the limits of 
agency power to modify existing regulatory structures. Direct repeal 
of existing interpretations and regulations is unlikely to succeed. Indi- 
rect attacks launched through agency reorganization and policy priori- 
tization are far more likely to succeed. 
Enforcement agencies seeking to repeal existing programs are 
likely to confront a potent legislative attack. FCC efforts to rescind 
the granting of preferences to minority broadcasters were greeted by 
the enactment of single-year funding restrictions forbidding such re- 
consideration.173 This direct challenge to existing rulemaking, com- 
bined with the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, "so poisoned 
relations between the two entities that it stimulated congressional 
oversight of a magnitude Washington insiders say is unprece- 
dented."174 Congress has used its power of the purse in other ways to 
correct agencies which disregard their past and, with it, legislative 
preferences. Such was the fate suffered by the Reagan appointee 
driven U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Unwilling to play ball with 
Congress, the Commission - in addition to being subjected to an ex- 
tensive GAO audit'75 - had its appropriations severely reduced and 
was directed by Congress to pursue specified research priorities and to 
allocate its appropriations internally according to a restrictive legisla- 
tive formula.176 Finally, Congress used its confirmation power to pun- 
Action is Here to Stay, FORTUNE, Apr. 19, 1982, at 143, 162. The primary cost of swimming 
against the political current, however, is the cost of doing battle with civil rights interest groups. 
For those who oppose numerical proofs of discrimination and affirmative action programs, the 
power of civil rights is analogous to powerful special interests throughout government. The 
difference in civil rights is that, unlike farm supports, trade tariffs, etc., policymaking implicates 
fundamental moral and economic concerns. This is a difference that matters. At the same time, 
the focus of concern should not be the efforts of special interests (for democratic free market 
politics dictates that special interests will advance their claims); instead, the focus should be on 
the ability of elected government to distinguish civil rights concerns from other types of 
concerns. 
173. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap- 
propriation Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101-Stat. 1329, 1329-31-32; Departments of Com- 
merce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. 
No. 100-459, 102 Stat. 2186, 2216-17; Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judici- 
ary, and Related Agencies, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988, 1020. 
174. Micromanagement of the FCC: Here to Stay, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56. 
175. See Brock, Politicizing the Government's Watchdog, Wall St. J., July 16, 1986, ? 1, at 22, 
col. 3. 
176. See Kurtz, Hill Slashes Funding for Rights Panel, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 1986, at A12, 
col. 4. See generally Comment, supra note 12, 492-95 (1987). 
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ish individuals within the administration who spearheaded 
confrontational operations. William Bradford Reynolds' appointment 
to the Associate Attorney General position at the Department of Jus- 
tice was turned down,177 as were the nominations of Jeffrey Zucker- 
man (to EEOC general counsel)178 and John Agresto (to Archivist).'79 
Interestingly, each of these exercises of congressional power was indi- 
rect. Congress never enacted substantive legislative amendments to 
correct administrative exegesis; rather, it relied on temporal measures 
such as single-year appropriations and the confirmation of single ad- 
ministration appointments. 
Enforcement agencies fare much better when the chosen weapons 
for change are reorganization, policy prioritization, and the simplifica- 
tion of existing regulations. These changes neither require congres- 
sional support nor do they force an agency to call attention to changes 
in existing policy. 
The ostensible purposes of agency reorganizations are to "maxi- 
mize efficiency and economy, promote effective planning and coordi- 
nation, reduce program fragmentation and overlap, eliminate 
unnecessary paperwork, and increase accountability."'80 During the 
Reagan years, however, reorganizations also enabled political appoin- 
tees to maintain greater control over their operations. For example, 
the EEOC created an Office of Legal Counsel charged with inter- 
agency coordination and the drafting of regulations.18' The Civil 
Rights Commission also traveled this road by creating an Office of 
Program and Policy Review to play the lead role in the drafting of 
Commission reports. Since political appointees fill these new offices 
with a cadre of trustworthy individuals, these offices - especially at 
the Civil Rights Commission - were used as workhorses of the new 
regime.'82 
Policy prioritization enables agencies to displace problematic pro- 
grams in favor of preferred programs. The EEOC proved the agency 
most adept at policy prioritization during the Reagan years. In Sep- 
177. See Dickinson, Running Scared in Pennsylvania: Sen. Specter Aims to Survive in Demo- 
cratic Territory, Wash. Post, July 6, 1985, at A4, col. 1; Kurtz, Reynolds' Nomination Voted 
Down, Wash. Post, June 28, 1985, at Al, col. 2; Duke, Senate Panel Rejects Reagan Nomineefor 
Associate Attorney General Post, Wall St. J., June 28, 1985, ? 1, at 3, col. 2. 
178. Thornton, Senate Rejects EEOC Nomination: Comments on Discrimination Were Issue, 
Wash. Post, May 21, 1986, at A23. 
179. Werner, Senate Panel Derails Nomination for Archives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1986, at D- 
16, col. 4. 
180. G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 135, at 156. 
181. See 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
182. Correlatively, when budget cuts forced the dismissal of agency employees, the ax dispro- 
portionately fell on "old line" pre-Reagan staffers. See, e.g., LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON THE CLOSING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION'S REGIONAL 
OFFICES (1986) (news release on file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review), 
cited in Comment, supra note 12, at 494 n.258. 
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tember 1984, the agency announced it would place greater emphasis 
on litigation to secure redress for identified victims of employment dis- 
crimination.183 The agency's emphasis on individual make-whole re- 
lief meant that fewer resources were available to pursue class action 
cases - whose remedies often included goals, timetables, and quo- 
tas.184 Yet pursuit of this individualized approach left existing regula- 
tions and directives used in class action litigation unaffected.'85 
Furthermore, class action litigation was not eliminated, just reduced 
(from sixty-seven percent, in fiscal year 1980, to thirty-five percent, in 
fiscal year 1986, of all nonsubpoena cases).'86 Consequently, while 
members of Congress disapproved of this approach,'87 the EEOC's 
shift from one legitimate policy objective to another did not raise legis- 
lative ire to the retaliation point. 
The EEOC also proved adept at policymaking through inaction, 
that is, through refusing to adopt reform initiatives. During the Rea- 
gan years, for example, the agency rejected comparable worth as a 
mechanism of determining job discrimination under Title VII,188 de- 
clined to extend Title VII to professional certification and licensing,189 
and refused to adopt regulations extending the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act to apprenticeship programs.190 These refusals did 
not alter the status quo ante and hence were not readily subject to 
legislative attack. 
Policymaking through the simplification of existing procedures is 
yet another device that enables agencies to attack regulatory excesses 
without challenging the bottom line. Take the case of the Reagan 
OFCC.191 Although not challenging the Executive Order program, 
the OFCC modified the program through internal directives, orders, 
183. EEOC Commissioners' Memorandum, Statement of Enforcement Policy, Sept. 11, 1984 
reprinted in REPORT, supra note 7, at 104-07. 
184. Williams, A Question of Fairness, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 70, 80. 
185. See 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 24. 
186. See id. at 38. One explanation for declining class action filings is that employers, after 
years of experience with Title VII demands, are less likely to commit class wrongs over time. 
Yet, in stark contrast to this "simple economics" argument, the Carter EEOC sought to shift 
resources from individual cases to "the equally vital task of identifying and attacking employ- 
ment systems that illegally operated to exclude whole classes of people from jobs or promotions." 
Leach, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the EEOC: An Agency in the Midst of Change, 29 
MERCER L. REV. 661, 669 (1978). 
187. See Letter from Rep. Augustus Hawkins, supra note 161. 
188. EEOC Decision No. 85-80 (1985 EEOC Lexis 19) (June 17, 1985; reissued with correc- 
tions July 12, 1985) (comparable worth decision). By contrast, the Carter administration seemed 
ready to endorse comparable worth. In 1979, Carter EEOC chair Eleanor Holmes Norton de- 
picted comparable worth as the most important issue of the 1980s. See Krucoff, Money: The 
Question of Men, Women and "Comparable Worth," Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1979, at B5, col. 1. 
189. EEOC Decision No. 87-2, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) ? 6869 (Aug. 
31, 1987). 
190. See supra note 168. 
191. See text accompanying notes 60-61. 
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and notices.192 OFCC, moreover, told its regional managers "not to 
require or to accept affirmative action plans with goals exceeding 
availability unless there were identifiable victims of discrimina- 
tion. . ."193 Ironically, the OFCC ultimately reverted to much of its 
Carter era enforcement strategy as a result of congressional pressures 
fueled by the failed efforts of William Bradford Reynolds and others to 
have President Reagan rescind Executive Order 11,246.194 
The Reagan years then tell a cautionary tale about executive 
power. Implementation strategies with modest objectives can move 
agency policymaking in the direction of administration priorities. 
However, once constituency and congressional expectations are well 
settled, efforts to replace existing approaches with a new regime will 
meet tremendous resistance. Since Congress holds the ultimate trump 
card with, among other things, its power of the purse, direct attacks 
such as those launched by the FCC and Civil Rights Commission 
seem doomed to failure. Consequently, after the enactment of legisla- 
tion and promulgation of initial agency regulations and interpretation, 
executive power lies principally at the margins. As such, White House 
centralization efforts cannot rewrite the nation's civil rights agenda. 
Furthermore, only a jerry-rigged structure can be assembled with the 
tools of executive power - appointments, reorganization, policy pri- 
oritization - and hence it is unlikely for a president to establish a civil 
rights legacy. 
Reagan's Legacy. Aside from judicial appointments, Reagan's at- 
tempts at centralizing civil rights enforcement will likely have little 
lasting effect. The Reagan administration spent some significant polit- 
ical capital in opposing voting rights legislation, vetoing the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act, supporting tax breaks for discriminatory pri- 
vate schools, and enabling the Justice Department to launch a frontal 
assault on preferential hiring. In paying the bill for these unpopular 
policies, moreover, the Reagan administration received very little in 
return. Internal discord and external pressures ultimately left the 
Reagan civil rights agenda in disrepair. The Reagan experience then 
cautions against serious White House centralization efforts that vary 
significantly from constituency and legislative expectations. 
192. See H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 194; see also 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 82-83. 
193. Id. at 82 (referring to OFCCP Memorandum for Area Office Directors). OFCC also 
eased pressure on national corporations by permitting the adoption of standardized affirmative 
action plans. See H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 194. 
194. See, e.g., Statement of Deputy Under Secretary of Labor Meisinger on OFCCP Enforce- 
ment Before House Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities, reprinted in Daily Lab. 
Report (BNA), at E-l (June 5, 1987); see also Letter from Larry Rogers to Susan Prado (July 7, 
1987), reprinted in 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 135. The "liberalization" of the OFCCP 
can be attributed, in part, to congressional pressure. See, e.g., Statements Before the House 
Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities at Oversight Hearing on Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at F-1 (June 4, 1987) (statement of 
Rep. Augustus Hawkins). 
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George Bush's strategy is proof positive of this lesson. Rather than 
follow "in the tradition of Ronald Reagan," as the 1988 Republican 
platform puts it,195 the Bush administration is clearly unwilling to stay 
the course in civil rights. Critical appointments at the Department of 
Education, Federal Communications Commission, Equal Employ- 
ment Opportunity Commission, and Civil Rights Commission suggest 
dramatic differences between Bush's approach to civil rights and Rea- 
gan's.196 Moreover, although he vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 
Bush's support of the Americans with Disabilities Act and minority 
scholarship programs further highlights differences between the two 
administrations. 
The Reagan experience offers a telling supplement to The Civil 
Rights Era. With legislative programs in place and hence little oppor- 
tunity to exert the type of raw power available during an agency's nas- 
cent development, White House policymaking operates within a 
culture of settled expectations. Consequently, the White House must 
face the external pressures of oversight committees and constituency 
interests. Centralization, moreover, is complicated by the internal 
pressures associated with the extraordinary sweep of modern civil 
rights enforcement. During the Reagan years, competing policy agen- 
das from within the administration seriously curtailed centralization 
efforts. Yet, contrary to Graham's assertions, the problem of centrali- 
zation was not one of bureaucrats run amok. Career bureaucrats did 
not derail the Reagan administration, for White House appointees 
generally seemed unsympathetic to the careerist's perspective.197 In- 
stead, the lesson of "full policy cycle" implementation is that internal 
and external pressures limit the scope of White House centralization. 
For example, marginal administrative adjustments such as reorganiza- 
tion, resource prioritization, and regulatory simplification appear 
more successful than direct conflict. In fact, policy blunders associ- 
ated with the confrontational approach cost the administration dearly. 
The Bush administration, for example, responded to these Reagan ini- 
tiatives by distancing itself so much from its Republican predecessor 
that Reagan's civil rights legacy amounts to very little indeed. In the 
end, the Reagan administration would have been better served by mar- 
ginal administrative adjustments such as reorganization, resource pri- 
oritization, and regulatory simplification than direct conflict. 
The Reagan years, however, do not speak to the futility of White 
House centralization. Iron triangles, contrary to Graham's depiction, 
195. 1988 Republican Party Platform reprinted in CONG. Q. 2369, 2399 (Aug. 20, 1988). 
196. See Devins, The Civil Rights Commission's Backslide, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1990, ? 1, at 
14, col. 4. Contrary to the title of my opinion piece (written by editorial page writers with a 
point of view of their own), I do not necessarily perceive that differences between the Bush and 
Reagan administrations represent changes for the worse. 
197. See Deregulation HQ REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1981, at 22-23 (interview of Murray L. 
Weidenbaum and James C. Miller III by Antonin Scalia and Anne Brunsdale, editors). 
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are impediments, not obstructions. The success of the Reagan EEOC 
is testament to this. Yet, when the political context dictates, the 
White House must be willing to play the game of subtle bureaucratic 
maneuvering, and this game promises only a modest payoff. Hence it 
is in accord with Graham's central contention about the limits of 
White House power. 
IV. CONCLUSION: ALL Is WELL IN MUDVILLE 
Proponents of a strong executive are likely to find disheartening 
the combined lessons of The Civil Rights Era and the Reagan experi- 
ence. Agencies appear inherently resistant to administration direc- 
tives; legislative and interest group pressures exacerbate these 
difficulties; and court opinions appear a disruptive wild card. Further- 
more, secondary policymaking devices that work within existing regu- 
latory regimes often serve as the principal mechanism for executive 
influence. Interestingly, proponents of an imperial Congress, too, are 
likely to be disturbed by both Graham's account and the Reagan 
years. The White House appears coequal in the enactment of legisla- 
tion,198 and agencies (frequently controlled by the executive) play the 
lead role in both the interpretation and implementation of legislation. 
Indeed, Congress must resort to a host of oversight techniques 
ranging from hearings to explicit budgetary constraints - to protect 
its lawmaking role. Weakness in executive and legislative power, how- 
ever, does not mean that agencies reign supreme. Presidential power 
to appoint, submit budgets, approve reorganizations, and monitor 
rulemaking severely limit agency power. Congress' oversight tech- 
niques as well as its ability to modify substantive law also undermine 
agency control. Furthermore, legislative and executive priorities may 
be at odds, thus making it impossible for an agency to please both 
198. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 is proof positive of the president's instrumental role in the 
shaping of legislation. When proposed, the Act, among other things, demanded that an em- 
ployer demonstrate that her employment practices are "essential to effective job performance" 
whenever a group of employment practices "results in a disparate impact .. ." S. 2104, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. S1019 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (emphasis added). After President 
Bush threatened to veto the measure, bill sponsors made significant concessions. Under the com- 
promise measure, the complaining party, where practicable, had to identify "which specific [em- 
ployment] practice or practices contributed to the disparate impact ...." H.R. Rep. No. 755, 
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990) (Conference Report) (emphasis added). Moreover, to defend se- 
lection practices, the employer need only show that "the practice or group of practices ... bear a 
significant relationship to successful performance of the job" to sustain her burden of proof. Id. 
at 2. Despite these compromise efforts, President Bush vetoed the bill, and the veto was sus- 
tained. See Dewar, Senate Upholds Civil Rights Bill Veto, Dooming Measure for 1990, Wash. 
Post, Oct. 25, 1990, at A15, col. 1. The success of the Bush veto suggests that the president, not 
congressional sponsors, may well be in the driver's seat in defining the terms of this debate. See 
Kenworthy and Lee, Civil Rights Compromise is Readied; House Democrats' Proposal Includes 
Controversial Cap, Wash. Post, May 17, 1991, at Al. This conclusion is bolstered by the House 
of Representative's June 5, 1991, failure to approve the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by a veto-proof 
majority. See Kenworthy, House Approves Civil Rights Bill; 273-158 Vote Would Not Override 
Veto, Wash. Post, June 6, 1991, at Al, col. 5. 
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constituencies. Consequently, contrary to Graham's assertions, bu- 
reaucracies do not reign supreme.199 
The end result is that the power to make and implement the law is 
diffuse rather than centralized in one branch of government or an- 
other. Moreover, as Terry Moe recognizes, "[t]he [increasing] layer- 
ing of presidential bureaucracy upon congressional bureaucracy ... 
will likely become a still more consequential - and organizationally 
disruptive - feature of American government ...."9200 This state of 
affairs, however, is precisely how modem government should work - 
the legislative and the executive branches are neither supreme nor 
without power; agencies serve as conciliators responding to competing 
executive and legislative pressures. 
The enactment and enforcement of civil rights laws then provides a 
model of the workings of modern government. While bemoaning the 
ultimate impotency of executive power, Hugh Davis Graham's The 
Civil Rights Era reveals that the executive possesses great power (if not 
control) - especially in the law enactment phase. The Reagan experi- 
ence likewise reveals that the executive can play an important - albeit 
transitory - role in the implementation of the law. While the Reagan 
White House may have poorly managed its power delegation, the ad- 
ministration's failure here is largely the failure of politics and not the 
failure of the presidency. 
199. The judiciary, while an important player, is more a wild card than a lead actor and, 
hence, I think it would be inappropriate to speak of judicial supremacy in the same way that I 
refer to legislative, executive, and administration supremacy. Granted, in some instances, disap- 
pointed constituent interests advance their policy objectives through the courts. See generally 
J. RABKIN, supra note 92. Indeed, on occasion, the courts - through the enforcement of injunc- 
tive relief - effectively transform government agencies into agencies of constituent interests. See 
id. at 147-81 (discussing "capture" of OCR through Adams lawsuit). Yet, these occurrences are 
rare and likely not to occur in the future. See Williams, Fingers in the Pie (Book Review), 68 
TEXAS L. REV. 1303 (1990) (reviewing J. Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions). Instead, it is far more 
likely that courts will defer to agency statutory interpretations and hence defeat these interest 
group efforts. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (agency interpretations are entitled to great deference, including the filling in of gaps left 
by Congress); cf J. RABKIN supra note 92, at 81 (noting that the Supreme Court's Chevron ruling 
"took it for granted that judges must hold executive operatives to those standards which they can 
discern as being intended by the enacting Congress"). At this level, the judiciary will function 
much as it did in The Civil Rights Era, that is, enabling the EEOC and other agencies to control 
the meaning of legislation. Indeed, since legislative delegations are often broad, agency interpre- 
tations - as Graham suggests - serve as an important policymaking tool. This is the lesson of 
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), a recent Supreme Court decision approving the Reagan 
administration's policy-driven interpretation of a 1970 family planning statute to forbid federally 
funded family planning centers from mentioning abortion. See also Bryner, Congress, Courts, 
and Agencies: Equal Employment and the Limits of Policy Implementation, 96 POL. SCI. Q. 411 
(1981). 
200. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN 267, 
328 (J. Chubb & P. Peterson eds. 1989). Moe further recognizes that "compromise" and "uncer- 
tainty" in American government makes both winning and losing groups impose "protective 
structures they know are impediments to effective performance." Id. at 327. Finally, "because 
presidents are constitutionally empowered and politically induced to control executive agencies, 
they cannot be stopped from acting to impose structures of their own that may be quite incom- 
patible with those prescribed by Congress." Id. 
The Civil Rights Hydra 
The Civil Rights Era, despite its many strengths, could benefit from 
a tighter, more analytically focused presentation. The book is too 
much like a travelogue and too little like a proof. Too much responsi- 
bility is placed on the reader to tie together Graham's assertions of 
agency power, White House centralization, and the rise of group 
rights. Graham's argument also would benefit from both a fuller 
treatment of existing topics (EEOC testing, early agency support of 
numerical proofs) and the inclusion of other relevant topics (race and 
education, minority business enterprise). Graham also goes too far in 
using the "imperial presidency" as his normative benchmark. That 
there is room for improvement, however, does not mean that the book 
does not succeed admirably. It does, but there is clearly room 
improvement. 
The Civil Rights Era (and the Reagan experience) reveals the lim- 
its of White House centralization in civil rights. Graham's interpreta- 
tion of these limitations as reflective of a tragic weakening of the 
presidency is subject to debate. In my view, limits on White House 
centralization are a necessary feature of the administrative state. 
While I disagree with Graham on this matter, I am mightily glad to 
have been able to base my judgment on a reading of The Civil Rights 
Era's lucid chronicling of the 1960-1972 period. 
1765 May 1991] 
